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Abstract 
Structural Health Monitoring (SHM) systems face many obstacles and gaps that 
have resulted in the slow implementation in real-world applications. These obstacles 
include technology performance, implementation issues and a solid business case that 
justifies the investment in a SHM system. The presentation of a solid business case for 
the SHM system is a great challenge and arguably is the main factor contributing to the 
slow implementation of this technology. The research intent of this dissertation is to 
focus on the business case by providing a tool to aid decision makers. Simulated aging 
aircraft flight data are used in this effort due to the fact that many aging military aircraft 
will be flying beyond their initially intended design life. An analytical model was 
developed to address the business case and the integration of the SHM system into 
Condition Based Maintenance (CBM). The model aids the calculation of the cost of Life 
Cycle (LC) events resulting from the implementation of the SHM system on an aging 
aircraft. In addition, the model captures the events and effect on aircraft availability due 
to different SHM detection threshold settings and replacement of degraded sensors. The 
model captures false alarm rates, crack growth, probability of detection, and sensor 
degradation amongst other parameters. The proposed analytical model is a useful tool 
that provides the decision makers the confidence to either implement the SHM system on 
an aging military aircraft or not. Two models were developed; one was the SHM system 
model with no degradation and the second was the SHM system model with simulated 
degrading sensors. Three major subcomponents of the SHM model will be the sensor 
detection component, the crack growth component and the sensor degradation component 
(second model only). Linking these three components where the main parameters of 
interest (crack length, sensor degradation/detection) are not static and accounting for 
v 
senor replacement will provide useful data of LC cost estimation that have not been 
accomplished before. 
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STRUCTURAL HEALTH MONITORING SYSTEM TRADE SPACE ANALYSIS 
TOOL WITH CONSIDERATION FOR CRACK GROWTH, SENSOR 
DEGRADATION AND A VARIABLE DETECTION THRESHOLD   
 
 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
Motivation 
 Aircraft (Structural Health Monitoring) SHM is a research area that will lead to a 
major change in the way we manage the health of our fleet in the future. Relatively few 
SHM systems are in operation on aircraft today. A review and a gap analysis of some of 
the relevant SHM literature led us to identify the current challenges facing the 
implementation of an SHM system.  Some of the main SHM system’s challenges are the 
technology performance, implementation issues and a solid business case. The 
presentation of a solid business case for such a system is considered very important as 
this challenge has a great impact on the decision to implement an SHM on an operational 
aircraft. 
A perspective of the structural mechanics program of the Air Force Office of 
Scientific Research on structural health monitoring (SHM) and non-destructive 
evaluation (NDE) was presented by (Giurgiutiu, 2008). NDE and SHM have an essential 
role in the operational readiness and safety of the Air Force fleet; however, considerable 
challenges face the operators and the maintainers due to aging aircraft. NDE techniques 
have proven to be reliable in detecting damage during phase inspections. SHM has great 
potential due to its on board sensors and systems that provide structural health assessment 
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on demand. This study concludes that considerable applied and fundamental research is 
needed to develop, integrate and implement SHM technology. 
Research Problem Statement 
Develop a decision support model to explore the tradespace associated with 
implementation of an SHM system on aging aircraft. 
Features of the model should include: 
• Capture representative crack propagation with respect to accumulated flight 
hours; 
• Capture representative performance of SHM sensors as influenced by SHM 
detection thresholds and acceptable crack lengths; 
• Capture representative change in detection of SHM sensors due to degradation as 
a result of accumulated flight hours; 
• Capture representative events and aircraft unavailability encountered due to 
sensor maintenance/replacement during SHM system scheduled and unscheduled 
maintenance; 
• Capture representative events and aircraft unavailability encountered due to 
aircraft scheduled and unscheduled maintenance associated with SHM alarm 
verification inspection and inspect/repair of aircraft; 
• Capture catastrophic failure events due to miss detection and a crack reaching the 
critical length. 
Assumptions and limitations of this model are as follows: 
• The SHM system monitors a hot spot on an aging military aircraft; 
3 
• Initially a single hot spot will be assumed; while not demonstrated in this 
research, the approach herein is readily extensible to monitoring multiple hot 
spots;  
• Degradation of sensors is due to loads exerted due to flight maneuvers; 
• While the model will capture event data, for purposes of this research notional 
event parameters will be utilized; 
• While maintenance events are captured by the model, a cost per event is not 
assumed or modeled.  
 
The model can be utilized for informing decisions associated with implementation 
of an SHM system on aging aircraft. This will be attained through the more realistic 
modeling of crack growth, sensor detection/degradation, cost and SHM system 
maintenance procedures associated with a particular aircraft.  
The outline of the dissertation is as follows: Chapter II will discuss the current 
state of aircraft SHM research and will build the case for what is proposed through this 
research effort. This is accomplished by identifying the gaps in previous SHM studies 
and will help support why this research effort is needed. Chapter III is a journal article 
demonstrating a trade space analysis of an aircraft equipped with a SHM system. This 
trade space analysis considers the effect of setting the SHM system detection threshold 
on the LC events. Chapter IV is a journal article that demonstrates the effect of the SHM 
system sensor degradation on the LC events that an aircraft might encounter. Chapter V 
discusses results, conclusions, future work and recommendations. 
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II. Literature Review 
Technology Performance 
Much research in the field of structural health monitoring (SHM) for aircraft has 
been conducted with performance objectives of reduced life cycle cost and increased 
availability. Yet there are still gaps that slow the implementation of SHM systems. The 
performance of SHM technology has been and is still being investigated. Many believe 
that available technology did not reach the maturity level for what we want to 
accomplish. In research on SHM by (Derriso et al., 2007) technical feasibility is 
described as facing three fundamental challenges: 1) small-scale damage must be 
detected in relatively large-scale structures, 2) SHM systems must work in an 
unsupervised learning mode, and 3) the redundancy and robustness of a SHM system 
must be reliable. Reliability and durability are a major technological concern for SHM 
systems. 
Reliability  
False alarms that could be produced from the SHM system cause more 
maintenance actions than are necessary. A simulation model of a prognostics and health 
management (PHM) system used as an autonomic logistics system (ALS) for the joint 
strike fighter (JSF) was developed and used by (Miller et al., 2007). Their simulation 
captured a large number of commonly used flight line measures of performance for 
aircraft availability and mission effectiveness. Multivariate statistical analysis of these 
measures provided ways to analyze the positive impact of a PHM system on aircraft 
sortie generation. On the other hand, their analysis showed a great sensitivity to false 
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alarms. This great sensitivity implies that more research effort should be devoted to 
investigating and trying to minimize false alarms which cause’s excessive downtime and 
cost without significantly degrading detection performance.  
Another experiment was conducted on a fast military jet by (Read et al., 2008) to 
try to test a SHM system in near real-world applications. A BAE Hawk jet carrying an 
experimental test pod with specimens that had crack initiators was used to test the effect 
of flight maneuvers on the SHM system detection capability and the possibility of 
detecting crack growth during flight. The conclusion was that this system was effective in 
detecting a crack and the growth of the crack during flight especially if false alarms can 
be avoided. The tests were run throughout the flight envelope in the presence of acoustic 
noise levels in excess of 135 decibels and considerable electromagnetic interference. 
With this experiment, one still can argue that the system was not attached to a real 
structure.  
Many reliability models are developed in the general area of structural 
monitoring. For example, a Reliability-Based System Assessment was used by Hosser et 
al. (2004) for monitoring building structures with sensors.  
For reasons of economy, structural monitoring currently has to be concentrated on 
the weak spots critical for the structural behavior and the corresponding uncertainties. In 
order to accomplish this, methods for the identification of such weak points and 
uncertainties are used for the definition of optimal monitoring measures as well as 
assessment and decision criteria. These methods are based on recognized procedures of 
reliability and system theory.  
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In order to make the application possible to building engineers without special 
training in reliability theory, the methods were summarized in the knowledge-based 
system PROBILAS (PRObabilistic Building Inspection and Life ASsessment). This 
computer code consists of a data base module, a computation module and a statistics and 
updating module, which are linked by graphical user interface and server for the 
optimization of the building assessment cycle. An essential component of the assessment 
is the illustration of the building as a system and its integration into the data base and the 
computation module of PROBILAS. Since the logical models of real structures, e.g. 
bridges, needed as elements of the system reliability computation can be very complex, 
methods are developed to identify and integrate the possible failure mechanisms. In their 
article, the building assessment cycle with the knowledge-based system PROBILAS is 
illustrated first. The continuous reevaluation of the system and the focusing of both the 
stochastic and the physical models on the failure-relevant parts of the system, limit states 
and parameters are characteristics of this cycle. A main focus of this article is on the 
methods of system integration. Some steps of the system generation run more or less 
automatically, e.g. the creation of response surfaces for the limit-state functions of system 
components. In other domains the monitoring engineer is consciously involved in the 
process while PROBILAS offers the necessary assessment and decision criteria. The 
different methods are described and demonstrated using an example of a bridge 
construction. 
 The large amount of data produced from monitoring needs improved statistical 
tools to clearly identify defects. A synopsis review conducted by (Sohn and Los Alamos 
National Laboratory, 2004) identified that in general there is not yet tools that are well 
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developed and implemented for statistical pattern recognition. Many damage detection 
methods try to identify damage by solving an inverse problem, which requires the 
construction of analytical models. An inverse problem can be described as a general 
framework that is used to convert observed measurements (i.e., monitoring data) into 
information about a physical object or system (i.e., defect) of interest. A neural network 
approach can be used to map the inverse relationship between the parameter of interest 
and the measured response. The main drawback for this approach is that a large amount 
of data is needed for the damaged and undamaged component and this is not available in 
the real world (Sohn and Los Alamos National Laboratory, 2004). Analysis of hypotheses 
approaches includes outlier analysis, statistical process control charts and simple 
hypothesis testing as indicated by this review.  These approaches are demonstrated to be 
very effective for identifying the onset of damage growth, and they are identified as one 
of the most significant improvements (Sohn and Los Alamos National Laboratory, 2004).  
Durability and Robustness 
Many studies show degradation of SHM sensors over time due to static loads, 
cyclic loads, temperature and corrosion. Durability and robustness are additional 
technology performance issues for an SHM system. 
An investigation on the effect of cyclic loads on sensor performance was 
conducted by Kuhn (2009) which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter III. In his 
research, degradation was identified in sensor performance as having a direct relationship 
with cyclic strain which was estimated by using a power law model. A probability of 
detection (POD) degradation model was also developed to show the overall performance 
of a SHM system. Research by Achenbach (2007) indicated that some of the technical 
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challenges for sensors are that they should be small, autonomous, cheap, robust, 
repairable, accurate, densely distributed, measure local and system level responses, and 
designed to measure relevant damage parameters. Beard et al. (2005) found that 
environmental conditions such as temperature can affect the signal obtained from sensors. 
This research used calibration to compensate for temperature variation based on the 
structure and application. A sensor diagnostics and validation process was presented by 
Park et al. (2006). It performs in situ monitoring of the operational status of a 
piezoelectric (PZT) active-sensor in SHM applications. Both degradation of the 
mechanical/electrical properties of a PZT transducer and the bonding defects between a 
PZT patch and a host structure could be identified by the proposed process in Park et al. 
(2006). The proposed process can provide a metric that can be used to determine the 
sensor functionality over a long period of service time or after an extreme loading event. 
More research is needed to understand all environmental factors that could degrade the 
sensing of an SHM system such as corrosion. Moreover, the maintenance action needed 
to bring the degraded SHM system back to its original condition needs to be investigated. 
Implementation Issues 
Design of an SHM system should be part of a system engineering framework that 
integrates health monitoring and maintenance with all other requirements for the system. 
For a new aircraft design, this would begin with the conceptual design of the system and 
would affect decisions regarding levels of maintenance and inspection intervals, among 
others. Less extensive implementations are being proposed for aging aircraft. A 
framework for SHM system design was presented which could be applied to aging 
aircraft through hot spot monitoring (Malkin et al., 2007). Understanding the structure of 
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interest and establishing requirements could start the framework flow. This flow ends 
with comparing requirements to specific SHM system designs. The data needed from an 
identified requirement for an SHM system can be obtained by focusing on the following 
points: 1) benefits and drawbacks of the SHM system, 2) requirements for the SHM 
system, 3) available SHM technologies, 4) detail design of the SHM systems, and 5) 
identifying the SHM design that meets the requirements and the cost of the SHM system 
that meets the requirements. Although this framework is developed for hot spot 
monitoring it could be modified for other applications. It would be useful if this 
framework could be modified to include the effect of sensor degradation. 
Research by Millar (2007) identifies that the barriers that have slowed acceptance 
and use of PHM tools in military propulsion systems over the past two decades were the 
product of incomplete total life cycle systems engineering management (TLCSM). The 
US Department of Defense Acquisition Guidebook states in Section 4.1.3 TLCSM in 
Systems Engineering: “It is fundamental to systems engineering to take a total life cycle, 
total systems approach to system planning, development, and implementation.” (Defense 
Acquisition Guidebook, 2004:Ch 4, 80). It is also important to implement TLCSM not 
only on new systems but also on legacy systems currently operating to control the high 
maintenance cost as the systems continue to operate beyond their design life. Further, the 
research describes up and down periods in the engine condition monitoring which are 
time phases. The up periods are triggered by the cost benefits that could be gained by 
successful monitoring and the down period is when the demanded monitoring technology 
is not available for the monitoring system. This study concludes that using TLCSM 
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through the systems engineering process is the right tool to close the gaps that held the 
large scale applications and implementation of integrated monitoring systems.  
Advanced integrated vehicle health monitoring systems (IVHM) are expected to 
formulate a decision response based on the extent of the damage unlike a pure monitoring 
system that only reports damage (Price et al., 2003). Price et al. sub-divided the problem 
to achieve the requirements of this system as follows: 1) Detection of damage events 
requires some knowledge of the environment in which the vehicle will operate and 
threats it will face, 2) The development of sensors will depend on the time required for 
the system to respond, 3) For events requiring a rapid response the use of passive 
embedded sensors is the best solution, 4) Characterization of damage may be 
accomplished during detection of damage or separately by using different sensors or 
using a sensor in different ways, 5) Active sensors could be employed to accomplish 
characterization of damage by being embedded in the structure, 6) Prioritization of the 
seriousness of damage and how it can compromise the mission of the vehicle is needed to 
give the level of urgency to the response, 7) Identification of the cause of the damage can 
be accomplished using an intelligent system, 8) Large number of sensors can provide 
information on the vehicle as a whole, 9) Formulation of a response of an intelligent 
system is dependent on the extent of the damage and could be a panic response for major 
damage requiring the isolation of a whole section of the vehicle, 10) Execution of a 
response could be a maintenance action or could be a more immediate action of limiting 
the flight maneuvers of the vehicle. This approach will be hard to implement on an aging 
aircraft where embedding sensors on the existing structure might be hard or infeasible. 
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The integration process of SHM on aging aircraft is a challenge. In the near 
future, an SHM system could be integrated on aging aircraft to monitor known failure 
modes as a starting step in the integration process. Aging aircraft face challenges on how 
to integrate an SHM system with Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) because design 
choices are limited by the existing system architecture. A number of integration issues 
were researched by Buderath (2004) and concluded the following: 1) There should be a 
clear process for integration to ensure the right selection of an SHM system, data 
analysis, and sensor location, 2) Integration technology should be researched in order to 
reach acceptance on all system levels, 3) An integrated process is needed during the 
development phase of an SHM system to be able to fully integrate with CBM, 4) 
Research should be extended to include the integration technologies, 5) When a 
successful SHM system and CBM integration is achieved we can improve safety and 
trigger maintenance action only when needed. 
Business Case 
The presentation of a solid business case for the SHM system is a great challenge 
and arguably is the main factor contributing to the slow implementation of this 
technology. Factors that could help create a business case are the understanding of the 
customer needs and requirements and performing a credible cost and risk analysis (Perez 
et al., 2010). 
Quantifying cost reduction 
Quantification of cost reduction in the total life cycle of a system by using SHM 
needs to be presented. There are few research attempts to quantify the cost benefit of 
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SHM found in literature. In one study, implementation of SHM on a commercial 
transport aircraft could result in an estimated 30% to 40% reduction in maintenance 
requirements. This would result in a recovery of the initial implementation costs in only 
two to three years (Kent et al., 2000). Another research effort (Schmidt et al., 2004) 
shows only a one percent reduction of the maintenance by using SHM systems on an 
AIRBUS aircraft, but it did not include the increased availability due to reduced 
inspection times. Another finding of this study is a reduced panel weight up to 15 percent 
by using SHM which impacts cost in many ways such as less fuel consumption and 
longer operating range. In the case of reusable launch vehicles a study has shown that the 
benefits of implementing a SHM system outweigh the cost (Derriso et al., 2007). Further, 
research on aging military aircraft show cost benefits of using SHM on some hot spots of 
the structure of a Tornado fighter as long as the hot spots with real payoff are identified 
(Boller, 2001).  
Systems level cost model 
A unique cost-benefit analysis for the allocation and cost justification of an 
Integrated System Health Management (ISHM) at the conceptual design level was 
presented by Hoyle et al. (2007). An optimization framework was used to determine the 
optimal allocation of ISHM to maximize profit. This was calculated using the following 
profit function (Π): 
 
Π = 𝐴𝑆 ∙  𝑅 − 𝐶 = ∏ 𝐴𝐹,𝑖  ∙ 𝑅 − ∑ (𝐶𝑅 + 𝐶𝐷)𝑖𝑁𝑖=1𝑀+𝑁𝑖=1              (1) 
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The objective function, referred to as Profit, Π, is expressed as the product of 
System Availability (𝐴𝑆) and Revenue per unit Availability (R), minus Cost (C), which is 
a summation of Cost of Detection (𝐶𝐷) and Cost of Risk (𝐶𝑅) over the total number of 
system functions N. The system availability is determined as the product of the 
availabilities of the N system functions and the M allocated ISHM sensor suites; the 
models function availability will differ for functions with and without ISHM. This 
framework can also determine the optimal detection/false alarm threshold and inspection 
interval. When this framework was applied to an aerospace system it was shown that 
applying ISHM increased profit by 11%, reduced cost by a factor of 2.4 and lengthened 
the inspection intervals by a factor of 1.5. It would be interesting to try to modify and use 
this framework for a system that does not have a clear identification for revenue, such as 
military systems which can benefit by a reduction in the total life cycle cost (LCC). 
Further it would also be interesting to modify this approach to include sensor degradation 
and its effect on the aircraft life cycle. 
Esperon-Miguez et al. (2012) studied a methodology that takes advantage of the 
historical maintenance data available for legacy platforms to determine the performance 
requirements for diagnostic and prognostic tools to achieve a certain reduction in 
maintenance costs and time. The effect of these tools on the maintenance process is 
studied using Event Tree Analysis, from which the equations are derived. However, 
many of the parameters included in the formulas are in reality not constant and tend to 
vary randomly around a mean value (e.g.: shipping costs of parts, repair times), 
introducing uncertainties in the results. As a consequence, the equations are modified to 
take into account the variance of all variables. Additionally, the reliability of the 
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information generated using diagnostic and prognostic tools can be affected by multiple 
characteristics of the fault, which are never exactly the same, meaning the performance of 
these tools might not be constant either. To tackle this issue, formulas to determine the 
acceptable variance in the performance of a health monitoring tool are derived under the 
assumption that the variables considered follow Gaussian distributions. 
Leao et al. (2008) proposed a cost benefit analysis methodology. This study 
presents a methodology to perform cost-benefit analysis on the application of PHM for 
existing (legacy) commercial aircraft. The methodology takes into account the 
characteristics of the commercial aircraft operation business to yield conclusions on the 
economic feasibility of the application of the technology to these platforms. The study 
presented guidelines to develop such calculations and the tools that may be used to 
analyze the results. The final product of the methodology is a cost benefit model which 
provides insight to the aircraft’s original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and to the 
aircraft operator on how PHM technologies should be applied in order to maximize their 
bottom lines. One of the draw backs of this model is that it treats false alarm rate as a 
constant value provided by the PHM technology manufacturer. 
Another cost model was presented by Hou-bo and Jian-min (2011). When they 
considered adopting and selecting a PHM technology, the first important step is to 
conduct the cost-benefit analysis. The purpose of implementing a PHM technology is to 
reduce failure rates and reduce cost needed for repair action. They proposed a Cost-
Benefit Model for PHM to identify the main factors of implementing PHM which can 
provide costs benefits. Obviously, none of the presented benefits come for free. Both the 
manufacturer and the operator must invest money in order to implement PHM. The costs 
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associated with development and operation, training costs of maintenance people and 
operations were taken into consideration. The model can be a useful tool for decision-
making and maintenance planning. On the other hand, for a SHM system, a different 
approach is needed because the structure is not designed and treated like a component 
that fails abruptly as considered in their study. The approach would need to be augmented 
to include sensors that are continuously monitoring a crack growth.  
Another approach by Kacprzynski et al. (2002) involves the developments 
associated with a PHM system design tool that integrates a model-based Failure Mode, 
Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) methodology with state-of-the-art system 
simulation directly linked to downstream Life Cycle Costs (LCC). This design tool will 
seek out recommended PHM system designs based on a cost function that accurately 
represents key LCC variables such as system availability, maintainability, reliability, and 
failure mode observability. The tool will be capable of assessing PHM sensor 
requirement specifications at the component and subsystem levels, and will then allow 
for integration into a broader integrated system model. Tradeoff, sensitivity and “what if” 
analysis will then allow the designer/user to examine the cost/benefit relationship of 
either adding or removing sensor and algorithms under consideration for the PHM 
design. This study is different from that proposed in this dissertation since it does not 
focus on the effect of degradation on the sensors. Further, it does not investigate the 
interaction between component degradation and sensor degradation and how it affects 
resulting events and availability of the aircraft. 
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Optimization and simulation models  
The number of sensors needs to be optimized to provide the desired effectiveness 
within cost and weight constraints as well as a balance between detection sensitivity, 
false alarms and the number of sensors.  
 A promising area for optimization is the use of genetic algorithms, which allows 
the determination of the optimal number and location of sensors for damage locations 
(Boller, 2000).  Optimization and simulation of a maintenance phase with SHM 
technology was used by Kapoor et al. (2008) to quantify benefits when applied to 
commercial aircraft. The effect of using SHM technologies to reduce maintenance 
downtime was provided. The concept of this approach was to identify the critical paths 
along the maintenance process. After a critical maintenance path was identified it was 
substituted with a SHM alternative. After optimization and simulation, a reduction factor 
of 6 to 100 hrs was found. This study indicates that further work for a better estimate of 
savings should involve employing the method proposed to a Maintenance Planning 
Document (MPD) with defined maintenance phases. Also this study did not include the 
effect of false alarms by SHM system. 
Williams (2006) suggested that the performance improvement on a system by 
implementing Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM) can be evaluated before 
design dollars are ever committed or contracts signed. By identifying the processes, 
measures of effectiveness (MOE), and input drivers, a discrete event simulation can be 
applied to assess the first order requirements for IVHM implementation on systems. 
Williams (2006) discusses the benefits to 5 different categories of operators: 1) the 
Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), 2) the mission operators, 3) 
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command/control elements, 4) fleet management, 5) and maintenance operators. These 
five categories may overlap in organizational structure and personnel, but they have 
clearly identifiable processes and performance that can be analyzed and measured. The 
paper then goes on to discuss how IVHM technologies impact events in the field and how 
the effects on individual events affect the MOEs of the larger system. Finally, an example 
is illustrated of the impacts IVHM has on the field performance of a notional system from 
a simulation run using a notional system and scenario data. This type of analysis enables 
a larger business case to be developed to aid designers and planners in their decisions of 
how to implement IVHM. It will be of great value to extend this study to include the 
IVHM system’s change of performance over time due to degradation in the IVHM 
sensors.  
Standardization 
Standardization of SHM systems across different platforms should help in 
reducing the ownership cost as well. In the automobile industry, SHM has great potential 
and has seen more aggressive application than the aircraft industry (e.g. On-Star System). 
Integrated system health monitoring in an automobile typically monitors important 
features such as Oil pressure, Engine Temperature, Tire pressure etc. (You, Krage, & 
Jalics, 2005) in which it was shown that standardization of remote diagnostics and 
maintenance systems between different automobile models will reduce cost 
tremendously. 
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Structural health monitoring cost models 
In a study by Pattabhiraman et al. (2010), the cost effectiveness of progressive 
inspection over scheduled inspection is analyzed. The lifecycle of an airplane was 
modeled as blocks of damage propagation interspersed with inspection. The Paris model 
(Beden et al., 2009) with random parameters is used to model damage growth and 
detection probability during inspections and it is modeled by Palmberg’s expression 
(Palmberg et al., 1986). SHM based progressive inspection were found to be 50% more 
cost effective than schedule-based preventive inspections. The sensitivity of the lifecycle 
cost to the inspection parameters has been studied. To accommodate critical panels which 
must be manually inspected, a hybrid model of inspection is also proposed. The hybrid 
model is found to have sufficient cost savings over a scheduled inspection model. In this 
model false alarms and SHM operation cost were neglected. 
Another study by Aldrin et al. (2007) presented a software package for integrating 
NDE and SHM design with product life cycle management models. Hybrid life 
management strategies for new and aging aircraft were proposed that combine traditional 
nondestructive evaluation (NDE) methods and recently developed SHM technologies. In 
recent times, a usual aim for managing the life of aircraft components that are critical or 
that are subject to fatigue or corrosion damage is to attempt development of in situ 
damage detection systems that can indicate when more detailed inspection is necessary. 
This creates a need for decisions about the type and settings of sensors and signal 
processing algorithms for the health monitoring system, and system type, settings, and 
scheduling for NDE. How well these systems are matched will have great influence on 
overall maintenance cost, aircraft availability and system reliability. 
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A study conducted by Wilmering and Ramesh (2005) focused on the means for 
assessing the impact of potential health management approaches on LCC as implemented 
within a system-engineering framework. A disciplined approach to selecting appropriate 
health management solutions to satisfy design and operational requirements was 
presented, and a software tool for performing trade studies of alternate approaches' 
impact on life cycle cost was discussed. A primary goal was to allow domain experts and 
health management specialists to perform thorough life cycle cost analyses without 
requiring the services of specialized cost analysts. 
Summarization of gaps 
There are a number of cost benefits studies for integrated system or vehicle health 
monitoring ISHM/IVHM. A fewer number of studies focus on the structural health 
monitoring system SHM LCC benefits. It is found by this literature review that a business 
case that relates LC events and aircraft availability to crack propagation, crack detection 
and sensor degradation has not been investigated. The sensors used for crack detection 
degrade over time due to flight stress. This is also accompanied by crack propagation due 
to the same flight stress. The use of current crack propagation modeling techniques 
accompanied with current structural health monitoring sensor degradation models should 
yield more realistic LC benefit analysis for the decision maker. In this effort, the overall 
LC model should also account for the effect on safety and availability due to sensor 
replacement triggered by SHM scheduled and unscheduled maintenance.  
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The following is Chapter III and it contains a journal article accepted by the Tech 
Science Press Structural Durability and Health Monitoring (SDHM) journal on July 2014. 
The title of the article is (Structure Health Monitoring (SHM) System Trade Space). 
Previously (Kuhn and Soni, 2009) described performance of SHM sensors and an 
approach to modeling them vs. accumulated flight hours on an aircraft.  This paper builds 
on the work of Kuhn and others to explore the trade space associated with detection, false 
alarms, unscheduled maintenance actions and mishaps associated with an installed SHM 
system with realistic crack growth assumptions.  In this paper, an approach to modeling 
the SHM detection performance as well as the changes occurring with the aircraft 
structure is demonstrated.  This model is used to evaluate candidate levels for a sensor 
threshold with predictable performance regarding detection, missed detections and false 
alarms.  It provides an analytic basis for establishing a business case for SHM 
implementation. 
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III. Structure Health Monitoring (SHM) System Trade Space Analysis 
 
Salman A. Albinali and David R. Jacques 
Abstract    
An analytic approach to exploring the tradespace associated with Structural 
Health Monitoring (SHM) systems is presented. Modeling and simulation of the life 
cycle of a legacy aircraft and the expected operational and maintenance events that could 
occur is shown. A focus on the SHM system detection of a significant crack length and 
the possibility of False Alarm (FA), miss detection and mishap events is investigated. 
The modeling approach allows researchers to explore the tradespace associated with safe 
and critical crack lengths, sensor thresholds, scheduled maintenance intervals, falsely 
triggered maintenance actions, and mishaps due to missed detections.  As one might 
expect, it was observed that setting the SHM system very conservatively (closer to safe 
crack levels) increases detection but causes a high number of FA events. On the other 
hand setting the SHM system threshold higher to tolerate a greater crack length reduces 
FA events but increases the number of Miss Detection events. Furthermore as cracks 
propagate to a greater length it was observed that Miss Detection events can lead to 
catastrophic failures causing (mishap) events.  The analytic approach described herein 
allows one to determine an acceptable balance between safety of flight and acceptable FA 
rates. The novelty of this approach is providing a life cycle analysis for a legacy aircraft 
equipped with SHM system with expected events (FA, Miss Detections) that could 
impact the life cycle and cost-benefit analysis. This was accomplished by combining the 
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method used in MIL-HDBK-1823 and Paris’s model and integrating it into a life cycle 
model reflecting changing crack size and detection in every flight sortie until the end of 
the life of the aircraft. This enables users to estimate the frequency of event occurrences 
and the costs associated with these events, thus contributing to a more accurate life cycle 
cost (LCC) analysis for an aircraft equipped with an SHM system. While the current 
model is applicable to crack propagation in metallic structures, analytic expressions for 
sensor signal variation associated with other damage/structure types would allow the 
current model to be extended for those applications.   
 
Keywords:  Structural Health Monitoring, Fatigue Crack Growth, Probability of 
Detection, False Alarms, Missed Detections 
Nomenclature   
 
𝑎 crack length 
𝑎𝑐𝑟 critical crack length at which failure occurs 
𝑎� system response signal to a crack length 
𝑎𝑡ℎ a crack size detected 50% of the time by the SHM system 
𝑎�𝑡ℎ signal threshold for a crack size detected 50% of the time by the SHM  
  system 
𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 minimum significant crack length 
𝑎0 initial flaw size (crack length) 
𝛽1 regression line slope 
𝛽0 regression line intercept 
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𝐶 material constant 
𝛥𝛿 pressure differential due to the stress load 
𝛥𝐾 difference between the stress intensity factors 
𝐾𝐼𝐶 fracture toughness 
𝐾𝑚𝑎𝑥 maximum stress intensity factor 
𝐾𝑚𝑖𝑛 minimum stress intensity factor 
𝑚 material constant 
𝑁 number of load cycles 
𝜎 standard deviation associated with probability of 𝑎� given 𝑎 
 
Introduction 
Operation and Maintenance (O&M) of aircraft often accounts for 70-80% or more 
of the total Life Cycle Costs (LCC) of military and civilian aircraft (Gilmore and Valaika, 
1992). For this reason, aircraft operators and maintainers are always looking for ways to 
reduce the O&M burden for both new and legacy aircraft.  Maintenance schedules are 
selected conservatively based on flight safety, but a higher frequency of scheduled 
maintenance increases O&M cost and may make it more likely that the maintenance 
actions themselves introduce system faults.  Performing maintenance tasks in a timely 
manner, with reduced cost and improved safety, is critically important for successful 
operation of any system, especially as resources are becoming scarce. If we examine the 
military aerospace field we note that many legacy systems will be operating beyond their 
original design life due to funding delays or schedule slips associated with new 
replacement aircraft. Life extension programs have often been implemented on these 
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legacy systems so that they can operate safely and effectively until a replacement system 
is available. Even with a life extension program, however, operating a legacy system can 
incur significant operations and support costs.  
One of the major concerns for aging aircraft is the structural health of the system. 
As the structure accumulates flight hours, cracks develop and propagate in that structure. 
In response, Non-Destructive Inspections (NDI) are used by the maintenance crews to 
find these cracks and perform maintenance if they grow beyond what is considered a safe 
length. These NDI are preformed periodically, usually based on flight hours. These 
inspections have some negative aspects associated with them. NDI causes aircraft down 
time affecting mission readiness, and increasing labor hours and maintenance costs. 
Further, between NDI intervals the length of the existing cracks in the structure are not 
known, which raises safety concerns. Condition-Based Maintenance (CBM) has been 
investigated in recent years to overcome these shortcomings by performing maintenance 
when needed as opposed to relying on more conservative maintenance intervals (Cutter 
and Thompson, 2005; Ellis, 2008).  
One of the necessary tools to achieve CBM is to continuously monitor the system. 
Structure Health Monitoring (SHM) is an approach that employs methods and tools to 
monitor the health of the structure continuously through on-board sensors, promising 
higher safety level and reduction in cost through extended inspection intervals and 
continuous monitoring. Many of the necessary SHM technologies are available, yet we 
see a slow implementation of these systems on operational platforms. Further, challenges 
involved in the development and transition of SHM technology including issues 
concerned with design, installations and validation methods for damage detection are still 
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present (Beard and Banerjee, 2011). It has been suggested that the lack of a solid business 
case clearly analyzing the cost benefit of a SHM system is one of the main causes of the 
slow implementation of such a system (Derrisoet al., 2007; Perez et al., 2010).  False 
Alarms (FA) from a SHM system will cause unnecessary maintenance actions, thus 
raising cost and aircraft availability concerns. Missed detections that might also occur 
when using a SHM system also create safety concerns. It is clear that these factors have a 
major impact on the business case. Trade space analysis that considers fatigue crack 
growth rates, SHM sensor performance, scheduled inspection intervals, and event costs is 
needed. This paper presents a trade space analysis for a legacy fighter equipped with an 
SHM system throughout its life cycle. Modeling and simulation using Monte Carlo 
analysis in the MATLAB® programming environment will be used as the trade space 
analysis tool. While the current model is applicable to crack propagation in metallic 
structures, analytic expressions for sensor signal variation associated with other 
damage/structure types would allow the current model to be extended for those 
applications.   
Fatigue crack growth 
Fatigue crack growth predictions are used to estimate the design life of aircraft 
structural components. They are used in design where a structural component is expected 
to operate safely with an existing crack until the crack reaches a length that is detectable 
by NDI, but less than a critical length (Roylance, 2001). Paris’s Law is one of the most 
widely used fatigue crack growth models and was used in this research effort (Paris and 
Erdogan, 1963). 
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 Paris’s Law 
Under a fatigue stress regime Paris’s Law relates sub-critical crack growth to 
stress intensity factor. The basic formula has the following form: 
 
𝑑𝑎
𝑑𝑁
= 𝐶∆𝐾𝑚                                                             (2) 
 
The term on the left side is known as the crack growth rate, where 𝑎 is the crack 
length and 𝑁 is the number of load cycles. The crack growth rate indicates the crack 
length growth per accumulated number of load cycles. 𝐶 and 𝑚 are material constants 
and ∆𝐾 is the difference between the stress intensity factor at maximum loading and 
minimum loading: 
 
∆𝐾 = 𝐾𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝐾𝑚𝑖𝑛 =  ∆𝛿√𝜋𝑎                                            (3) 
 
where 𝐾𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the maximum stress intensity factor, 𝐾𝑚𝑖𝑛 is the minimum stress 
intensity factor and ∆δ is the pressure differential due to the stress load. 
Probability of detection (POD) 
The primary focus of a SHM system is to reliably detect a significant crack length 
𝑎 just like the NDI does, but to perform this task continuously during operation of the 
system. The performance of a SHM system can be demonstrated using 𝑃𝑂𝐷(𝑎) curves. 
(Kuhn and Soni, 2009; Kuhn, 2009) showed that 𝑃𝑂𝐷(𝑎) can be evaluated using the 
following formula: 
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𝑃𝑂𝐷(𝑎) = 𝑃(𝑎 � > 𝑎�𝑡ℎ) = 𝛷 �𝛽0+𝛽1∗ln(𝑎)−ln(𝑎�𝑡ℎ)𝜎 �                              (4) 
 
𝑃𝑂𝐷(𝑎) is modeled by performing linear regression on an 𝑎 vs. 𝑎 �  functional 
relation that has normally distributed residuals with constant variance, where 𝑎 �  is the 
measured system response of a NDI system to a crack of length 𝑎. Units depend on the 
particular inspection system. MIL-HDBK-1823 (Department of Defense, 1999), 
describes NDI experimental data showing a linear regression line relationship relating 
ln(𝑎) to ln(𝑎 �), where 𝛽0 is the regression line intercept, 𝛽1 is the slope, 𝑎�𝑡ℎ is the signal 
threshold for a NDI system (the value of  𝑎 �  below which the signal is determined to have 
been caused by a crack of insignificant length) and 𝜎 is the standard deviation of the 
residuals of a linear regression fit of 𝑎 vs. 𝑎 �  data as represented in Figure 1 (Department 
of Defense, 1999). A more intuitive explanation of the generation of the POD equation 
showing practitioners how properties of SHM data affect the rotation and translation of 
the POD curve was pressed by (Pado et al., 2013). 
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Figure 
Figure 1: Linear regression fit of ln(𝑎) vs. ln(𝑎 �) data (Department of Defense, 1999) 
 
Confusion Matrix 
In a scenario where a NDI or SHM system is attempting binary detection 
(crack/no-crack) of a crack of length 𝑎 there are four possible outcomes: 
 
1) The system detects a crack and a crack of significant length actually  
  exists; this is declared a True Detection event; 
2) The system detects a crack and either the crack does not exist or the length 
  of the crack is not considered significant; this is declared a FA event; 
3) The system does not detect a crack and a crack of significant length does  
  not exist; this is a True Negative event; 
4) The system does not detect a crack but a crack of significant length exists;  
  this is a Missed Detection event. 
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These four probabilities can be represented in a “Confusion Matrix” shown in 
Figure 2 (Fawcett, 2006).  The confusion matrix is used for predictive analysis. 
Typically, the probabilities appearing in the matrix are determined through test or 
historical data collection.   
 
 
In operating an aircraft, FA rates or false calls raise concerns due to the fact that 
these will drive unnecessary maintenance actions that will affect mission readiness and 
cost. Even beyond concerns for unnecessary maintenance actions, false alarms could 
result in premature mission terminations.  Missed Detections raise concerns due to the 
fact that they might cause an aircraft mishap due to unforeseen/undetected structural 
problems. A graphical representation of the confusion matrix probabilities distributions 
plus the threshold level of an NDI or SHM system is represented in Figure 3 (Kuhn, 
2009).                                      
 
Figure 2: Confusion Matrix 
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Figure 3: Graphical representation of the probabilities and the Threshold Detection Level 
(Kuhn, 2009) 
 
It is important to note that adding the FA and True Negative probabilities equals 
1. Likewise adding the True Detection and Miss Detection probabilities equals 1. It can 
be observed from Fig. 3 that varying the threshold 𝑎�𝑡ℎ will affect sensor performance. 
Moving 𝑎�𝑡ℎ to the right will result in less FA and less Detections. Moving 𝑎�𝑡ℎ to the left 
will result in more Detections and more FA. The variance (standard deviation)  of the 
response signal 𝑎� can also affect sensor performance as it will determine the amount of 
overlap for pdfs associated with a given crack length and that associated with a “safe” 
structure. In this research the effect of a crack growth on a legacy fighter will be 
simulated for each sortie up to the time when a mishap (catastrophic failure) occurs or the 
end of the design life of the aircraft is reached, whichever occurs first. For every sortie, 
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corresponding to a set number of load cycles, SHM system detection will be simulated 
based on the current crack size and sensor performance, POD(a).  
For this analysis, the SHM system will be assumed to follow an NDI-like 
detection trend whereby a larger crack will generate a larger mean signal response; the 
analysis approach easily supports a piezo-like sensor whereby the trend is reversed 
(larger cracks generate smaller mean signal response). An event corresponding to one of 
the quadrants of the confusion matrix will occur at each sortie.  First, a true detection 
event will trigger an inspection and a repair action will occur. Second, a FA event 
triggering an inspection can occur. For an FA event, subsequent NDI will identify the 
true crack size.  In this research, NDI performed post-flight is assumed to be perfect; in 
future work this assumption will be relaxed. Third, a missed detection event triggering 
the possibility of a mishap can occur.  A missed detection of a crack that is still less than 
some defined critical length will not cause a mishap; however, missed detection of a 
crack that grows to a length equal to or exceeding a critical length will result in a mishap. 
Finally, a true negative event triggers no action, and the aircraft is assumed ready for the 
next sortie.  
Varying the sensor detection threshold, 𝑎�𝑡ℎ, minimum crack length detected 
requiring a repair action, 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒, and the standard deviation of the distribution will be 
investigated to study the effects of these SHM system sensor performance parameters on 
the number of maintenance events and mishaps that occur.  For this research, a single 
critical crack location is modeled, but the methods described herein are extensible to 
multiple crack locations, and future work will extend the model to accommodate them. 
Further, this method is applicable for damage detection in composite panels where the 
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extent of the damage is an area (compared to crack length) and the extent of the damage 
includes severity. As long as experimental data can show and reflect a relationship 
existing between damage characteristics/severity and signal response by SHM system 
that could be later modeled this method is applicable. 
Methodology 
Modeling and simulation using MATLAB® was the method used in this research. 
Figure 4 shows an event flow diagram depicting SHM related events for a legacy aircraft 
equipped with SHM system. 
 
 
 
Figure 4:  Flow diagram for SHM equipped aircraft 
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The simulation model starts at takeoff, depicted on the bottom left side of Figure 
4. To initialize the model, a threshold, 𝑎�𝑡ℎ,  safe crack length, 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒, and a standard 
deviation σ are set and kept for the life time of the aircraft. An initial flaw size is used to 
initialize the crack growth model based on the Paris model discussed previously (Paris 
and Erdogan, 1963). After takeoff, the model generates a probability distribution for the 
crack length in that specific sortie based on the growth model and the number of 
accumulated flight hours in service or since previous crack repair. A Monte Carol draw is 
initiated simulating SHM system detection. If the system response signal 𝑎� is less than 
𝑎�𝑡ℎ no SHM detection occurred. The model will check if the crack length 𝑎 is greater 
than the critical crack length, 𝑎𝑐𝑟. If that is true the model will declare a catastrophic 
structure failure leading to an aircraft mishap. Otherwise the aircraft will land. Then the 
model will check if 𝑎 is greater than 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒, and if that is true a missed detection event 
will be recorded. Note that while missed detections are recorded in the simulation for 
later analysis, the SHM system has no knowledge that a missed detection has occurred.  
If no detection occurs and 𝑎 < 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 , a true negative event will be recorded. If the 
aircraft reached its maximum life the simulation run for this aircraft will end and a new 
simulation run will start; otherwise, the model will propagate the crack length by the 
amount simulated for one sortie and takeoff again. For any sortie, if 𝑎 �  is greater than 𝑎�𝑡ℎ, 
SHM detection occurs and the sortie will be aborted. An inspection will occur and if 𝑎 is 
greater than 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒, a true detection event will be recorded. The crack length will be reset 
simulating a repair or a replacement of a structural component and the aircraft will take 
off again. If 𝑎 is less than 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒, a FA event will be recorded, the crack 𝑎 will be 
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propagated, and the aircraft will takeoff again. This will continue until the end of design 
life or catastrophic failure of the aircraft. For a given set of 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒, 𝑎�𝑡ℎ and σ, 100 
simulation runs will be performed, each one having a randomly selected initial flaw size 
and growth rate parameter. After that a different set of 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒, 𝑎�𝑡ℎ and σ will be used so 
trade space analysis on the affect of SHM sensor performance and crack length on events 
can be performed.  
Fatigue crack growth subroutine 
A fatigue crack growth subroutine model was developed to simulate the crack 
length propagation in every sortie. By integrating the Paris model Equation 2 and solving 
for 𝑎𝑖 which is the crack length after 𝑁𝑖 cycles (flights) we get (An et al., 2012): 
 
𝑎𝑖 = �𝑁𝑖𝐶 �1 − 𝑚2� �∆𝛿√𝜋�𝑚 + 𝑎01−𝑚2 � 22−𝑚                                  (5) 
 
where 𝑎0 is assumed to be the initial flaw size (crack length) existing in a new or repaired 
structural component (Heida and Grooteman, 1998). Uncertainty is applied to the value 
of 𝑎0 to reflect that this value is different every time a repair or replacement is done to the 
structure. The pressure differential, ∆δ, due to the stress load can be evaluated by using 
the expression (An et al., Chol, 2012): 
 
∆𝛿 = 𝐾𝐼𝐶
�𝑎𝑐𝑟𝜋
                                                             (6) 
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where 𝐾𝐼𝐶 is the fracture toughness, a material property provided by the manufacturer of 
the structural component. ∆δ is modeled with uncertainty to simulate the variation in 
loads an aircraft structure is exposed to for any given sortie. Figure 5 is a presentation of 
the fatigue crack growth simulation with 10 runs reflecting 10 repairs or replacements to 
the structural component. 
 
 
Figure 5: Fatigue crack growth simulation results for 10 runs 
 
It is shown in Figure 5 that every run has a different 𝑎0 and the growth rate with 
different loads ∆δ causing the crack to propagate differently after each replacement or 
repair. Also a representation of 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 , a minimum crack considered to be significant for 
SHM monitoring is shown on the figure. Detected cracks of length smaller than 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 
will not be repaired.  The figure also shows 𝑎𝑡ℎ, a crack size having an associated SHM 
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response designated as the threshold for detection, 𝑎�𝑡ℎ. Both 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 and  𝑎�𝑡ℎ will be varied 
to simulate the performance of the SHM system. 
 Probability of detection subroutine 
A probability of detection (POD) simulation subroutine was developed to 
simulate the SHM system response to a crack length occurring for every sortie. A 
probability of detection of the threshold crack 𝑎𝑡ℎ, detected 50% of the time, will be 
evaluated using Equation 4 in the following form: 
 
𝑃𝑂𝐷(𝑎) = 0.5 = 𝛷 �𝛽0+𝛽1∗ln(𝑎𝑡ℎ)−ln(𝑎�𝑡ℎ)
𝜎
�                                         (7) 
 
The signal threshold 𝑎�𝑡ℎwill be solved for and used in the following equation: 
 
𝑃𝑂𝐷(𝑎) = 𝑃(𝑎 � > 𝑎�𝑡ℎ) = 𝛷 �𝛽0+𝛽1∗ln(𝑎)−ln(𝑎�𝑡ℎ)𝜎 �                                    (8) 
 
where the crack length 𝑎 from the fatigue crack growth simulation will be used and a 
Monte Carlo draw will be preformed every sortie. The constants 𝛽0 and 𝛽1 are evaluated 
by performing linear regression on experimental data provided by MIL-HDBK-1823 
(Department of Defense, 1999). Since varying 𝑎𝑡ℎ will directly vary 𝑎�𝑡ℎ as shown from 
the previous equations, only 𝑎𝑡ℎwill be used in the rest of the discussion. The variables 
𝑎𝑡ℎ and 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 are held constant for a given run, but varied for different simulation runs as 
a percentage of 𝑎𝑐𝑟. Also, the standard deviation σ associated with the 𝑎� vs. 𝑎 pdf will be 
set for a given simulation run and varied for different runs.   
Parameter Values and Recorded Events 
The main simulation routine tallies several different events for the tradespace 
analysis. The number of FA events and Miss Detection events will be recorded for 
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different sets of 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒, 𝑎𝑡ℎ and σ. The parameter 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 will have five values, and for 
every value of 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒, 𝑎𝑡ℎ will have a corresponding eight values and σ will have four 
values. For each combination of 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 , 𝑎𝑡ℎ, and σ, 100 simulation runs will conducted 
and the average FA and Miss Detection events will be calculated. The results will be 
displayed and discussed in the following section. 
Results and Discussion 
FA events 
Figure 6 (a) displays the effect of fixing the standard deviation σ at 0.1 and 
varying 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 with the values 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9% of 𝑎𝑐𝑟. For every 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 value, the 𝑎𝑡ℎ 
value was incremented eight times starting at 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 using increments of 1% of 𝑎𝑐𝑟. For 
example, if 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒= 5% 𝑎𝑐𝑟 then 𝑎𝑡ℎ will be incremented as 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12% 
of 𝑎𝑐𝑟. This is repeated for Figure 6 (b), (c) and (d) with standard deviation σ = 0.2, 0.3, 
and 0.4. It is observed from Figure 6 (a) that as 𝑎𝑡ℎ is moved about 2% from 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 a 
significant drop in the number of FA events is noticed. The greater the 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 percentage 
the greater the number of false alarm events recorded. From Fig. 6(b), as the standard 
deviation is increased from σ = 0.1 to σ = 0.2, it is observed that we have the same trend 
shown in Figure 6 (a) but with an increase in FA events. Also it is observed that an 
increase of 𝑎𝑡ℎ by about 3% over 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 essentially eliminates FA events. From Figure 6 
(c), as the standard deviation is increased from σ = 0.2 to σ = 0.3, it is observed that we 
have the same trend shown in Figure 6 (b) with very close FA events, but it now requires 
an increase of 𝑎𝑡ℎ by about 5% over 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 to essentially eliminate FA events. Similarly 
in Figure 6 (d), as the standard deviation is increased from σ = 0.3 to σ = 0.4, it is 
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observed that it now requires an increase of 𝑎𝑡ℎ by about 8% over 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 to essentially 
eliminate FA events. 95% confidence intervals bars are shown on all figures based on 
100 simulation runs.  
 
 
Figure 6: % 𝑎𝑡ℎ  of 𝑎𝑐𝑟 for a crack detected 50% of the time vs. Average number of FA 
events for different standard deviation levels 𝜎 
 
Miss Detection events 
From Figure 7 (a) we observe that if 𝑎𝑡ℎ is moved about 3% above 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 a 
significant increase in number of Miss Detection events is noticed. Note that a single 
missed detection is not fatal as long as detection on a subsequent sortie occurs prior to the 
crack reaching a critical length. From Figure 7 (b) it is observed that, as the standard 
deviation is increased for σ = 0.1 to σ = 0.2,  the same trend as Figure 7 (a) is shown, but 
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𝑎𝑡ℎ  needs to be at least 4% more than 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 to reach the same number of Miss Detection 
events shown in Figure 7 (a).  A similar trend is shown in Figure 7 (c) where it is 
observed that, as the standard deviation is increased from σ = 0.2 to σ = 0.3,  𝑎𝑡ℎ  needs to 
be at least 5% more than 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 to reach the same number of Miss Detection events as 
shown in Fig. 7(b).  For σ = 0.4, shown in Figure 7 (d), 𝑎𝑡ℎ  needs to be at least 6% more 
than 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 to reach the same number of Miss Detection events as shown in Figure 7 (c). 
In general, a decrease in the standard deviation and an increase in the difference between 
𝑎𝑡ℎ  and 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 results in an increase in the average number of Miss Detection events.  
Referring back to Figure 3, an increase in the standard deviation of the distributions 
results in greater overlap, improving the Miss Detection performance at the expense of 
higher FA rates. 
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Figure 7: % 𝑎𝑡ℎ  of 𝑎𝑐𝑟 for a crack detected 50% of the time vs. Average number of Miss 
Detection events for different standard deviation levels 𝜎 
 
Average crack length detected after a Miss Detection event  
It is of interest to know the average crack length once detected after a Miss 
Detection event as percentage of 𝑎𝑐𝑟  as it reflects a safety concern.  As noted previously, 
an initial missed detection can be detected during a later sortie as long as it does not reach 
the critical length causing a mishap.  Before discussing these results, it is important to 
note that each detection attempt is treated independently, and the treatment herein 
assumes no degradation of the sensor (although research accounting for sensor 
degradation over time is ongoing). The following plots represent the simulation output 
for the crack length once detected as a percentage of 𝑎𝑐𝑟. 
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Figure 8: % 𝑎𝑡ℎ of 𝑎𝑐𝑟 for a crack detected 50% of the time vs. Average length of a crack 
detected after a miss detection event as a percentage of 𝑎𝑐𝑟 for different standard 
deviation levels 𝜎 
 
From Figure 8(a) it can be observed that, as 𝑎𝑡ℎ is increased further away from 
𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒, the crack length once detected after initial miss detection increases. Also, as 
expected, a greater value of 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 results in greater crack lengths once detected, which 
can become problematic as they approach a critical length. The obvious contribution to 
this increase is the fact that, as 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒  is increased, the size of the smallest crack that you 
intend to detect increases.  However, it is important to note that the crack growth rate 
monitonically increases (see Figure 5); higher values for 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 result in higher growth 
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rates for 𝑎 > 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒. Sweeping across Figure 8(a), (b), (c) and (d) to observe the effect of 
change in standard deviation, it is noted that the length of the crack once detected is the 
greatest for the smallest 𝜎 = 0.1 and the greatest 𝑎𝑡ℎ.  This can be expected as the 
combination of these parameter trends increases the separation and decreases the overlap 
between the “safe” and “detectable” crack distributions.  As the standard deviation 
increases there is a smaller change in the length of the crack detected after a Miss 
Detection event is observed due to greater overlap between the distributions. 
Miss detection leading to a catastrophic failure 
The previous section leads one to the question as to what values for 𝑎𝑡ℎ and 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 
result in a significant chance that a Miss Detection leads to a catastrophic failure (𝑎 ≥ 𝑎𝑐𝑟 ) of the structure component. Based on the crack growth model, growth is very slow 
for low numbers of load cycles (or sorties), but increases significantly as the load cycles 
accumulate.  The simulation is coded to flag every time the crack length 𝑎 is equal or 
greater than the critical length 𝑎𝑐𝑟 and declare a catastrophic failure, and these results will 
be shown for increasing values of 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 and 𝑎𝑡ℎ.  
Figure 9 displays the effect on the percentage of mishaps based on varying the 
threshold 𝑎𝑡ℎ from 50% to 90% of 𝑎𝑐𝑟. For this analysis, 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 was set at 50% of 𝑎𝑐𝑟 and 
the standard deviation σ was set at 0.4. It is observed that varying 𝑎𝑡ℎ from 50% to about 
55% of 𝑎𝑐𝑟 did not result in any aircraft mishap events from the simulation runs. Once 
the threshold is increased beyond 55% of 𝑎𝑐𝑟 mishap events are noticed. Setting the 
threshold set at 65% 𝑎𝑐𝑟 resulted in approximately 10% mishap events (based on 100 
simulation runs). As expected, the trend of increasing mishap rates for increasing 
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detection thresholds continued.  This preliminary analysis clearly shows how tradespace 
analysis can be conducted to show safe operating regimes resulting in minimal 
probabilities of catastrophic failure and acceptable false alarm rates. 
 
 
 
Figure 9: % 𝑎𝑡ℎ of 𝑎𝑐𝑟 for a crack detected 50% of the time vs. Average mishap 
percentage of number of simulation runs 
 
Conclusion 
Summary and findings 
The tradespace analysis approach described herein shows how SHM sensor 
performance design parameters 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒, 𝑎𝑡ℎ and σ can affect the number of FA, Missed 
Detections and mishap events that could occur over the expected life of an aircraft. If 
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design parameters are set conservatively with regards to safety, a high number of false 
alarms will result, with a subsequent increase in maintenance events and cost. 
Conversely, higher value for 𝑎𝑡ℎ with respect to 𝑎𝑐𝑟 result in a reduction in FA events, 
but an increase of Miss Detection. Further increase in 𝑎𝑡ℎ with respect to acr can result in 
Miss Detection events leading to mishaps. With safety of flight as a primary 
consideration, the SHM system sensor parameters can be adjusted to reduce the 
probability of mishap events to an acceptably low level while also keeping FA rates, and 
related maintenance costs, at an acceptable level.  
Future work 
Although installing an SHM system with a certain expected performance might 
produce expected cost savings, better operational readiness and improved safety, the 
degradation of the SHM system will be a concern in its own right. Any system installed 
on an aircraft is likely to degrade with operation. Systems installed on aircraft typically 
require maintenance and inspection schedules to ensure continued acceptable operation. 
The same is true for the SHM system. Kuhn’s research (Kuhn and Soni, 2009; Kuhn, 
2009) concluded that degradation to the SHM system sensors due to flight loads affect 
the performance of such a system.  Ongoing work is investigating the effect of 
degradation on SHM performance parameters such as 𝑎�𝑡ℎ and σ, amongst others, on the 
FA, Miss Detection and mishap events an aircraft might experience. Also maintenance of 
the SHM system itself will be considered.  SHM system unscheduled maintenance will be 
based on the maximum FA events encountered between SHM system scheduled 
maintenance intervals which will be based on flight hours.  Extensions to this work for 
composite structures and other damage types are also being investigated. 
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The following is Chapter IV and it contains a journal article that will be submitted 
to the Journal of Structure Health Monitoring. The title of the article is (Utility and Effect 
of Employing a Variable Threshold for Countering the Effect of Degrading SHM 
Sensors). Kuhn and Soni (2009) previously described performance and degradation of 
SHM sensors and an approach to modeling them vs. accumulated flight hours on an 
aircraft.  This paper builds on the work of Kuhn and others to explore the effect of sensor 
degradation on detection, false alarms, unscheduled maintenance actions and mishaps 
associated with an installed SHM system with realistic crack growth assumptions.  In this 
paper, an approach to modeling the SHM detection performance/ sensor degradation as 
well as the changes occurring with the aircraft structure is demonstrated.  Also the utility 
and effect of employing a variable threshold is discussed. This model is used to evaluate 
sensor performance under degradation with predictable performance regarding detection, 
missed detections and false alarms.  It provides an analytic basis for establishing a 
business case for the SHM system implementation. 
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IV. Utility and Effect of Employing a Variable Threshold for Countering the Effect 
of Degrading SHM Sensors 
 
Salman A. Albinali , David R. Jacques, Christine M. Schubert Kabban and Alan Johnson 
Abstract 
The degradation associated with a Structural Health Monitoring (SHM) system’s sensors 
is considered using an analytic approach. Expected operational and maintenance events that could 
occur due to degradation is explored though modeling and simulation of the life cycle of a legacy 
aircraft. The SHM system’s ability to detect a crack of significant length degrades over time, and 
it affects both the possibility of False Alarm (FA) and Miss Detection events. Degradation in the 
SHM system increases the number of FA events which raises a maintenance cost concern. 
Degradation also causes a concurrent reduction in the number of Miss Detection events. The 
analysis demonstrates that employing a variable detection threshold to counter the effect of 
degradation can significantly lower the number of FA events while maintaining Miss Detection 
events at an acceptable and safe level. Uncertainties in the assumed degradation factors are 
accounted for in the model, resulting in degraded performance, but a variable threshold is still 
capable of maintaining FA events lower than they would be for the constant threshold case. 
Determining acceptable FA and Miss Detection rates by employing a variable threshold to 
counter the effect of degradation can be achieved using the analytic approach described herein. 
This paper provides a life cycle analysis for a legacy aircraft equipped with a SHM system with 
degrading sensors leading to events (FA, Miss Detections) that could impact the life cycle and 
cost-benefit analysis. The frequency of event occurrences and the costs associated with these 
events can be estimates by users, thus contributing to a more accurate Life Cycle Cost (LCC) 
analysis for an aircraft equipped with a degrading SHM system. 
47 
Keywords 
Structural Health Monitoring, Fatigue Crack Growth, Probability of Detection, 
Degradation, Threshold, False Alarms, Missed Detections 
Nomenclature   
𝑎 crack length 
𝑎𝑐𝑟 critical crack length at which failure occurs 
𝑎� system response signal to a crack length 
𝑎𝑡ℎ a crack size detected 50% of the time by the SHM system 
𝑎�𝑡ℎ signal threshold for a crack size detected 50% of the time by the SHM  
  system 
𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 minimum significant crack length 
𝑎0 initial flaw size (crack length) 
𝛼 degradation in the intercept factor 
𝛽1 regression line slope factor 
𝛽0 regression line intercept factor 
𝐶 material constant 
𝛥𝛿 pressure differential due to the stress load 
𝛾 degradation in the slope factor 
𝛥𝐾 difference between the stress intensity factors 
𝐾𝐼𝐶 fracture toughness 
𝐾𝑚𝑎𝑥 maximum stress intensity factor 
𝐾𝑚𝑖𝑛 minimum stress intensity factor 
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𝜓 degradation in the standard deviation factor 
𝑚 material constant 
𝑁 number of load cycles 
𝜎 standard deviation associated with probability of 𝑎� given 𝑎
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Introduction 
It has been reported that 70-80% or more of the total Life Cycle Costs (LCC) of 
military and civilian aircraft is due to the Operation and Maintenance (O&M) cost 
(Gilmore and Valaika, 1992). Therefore, aircraft operators and maintainers are always 
looking for ways to reduce the O&M burden for both new and legacy aircraft.  
Maintenance schedules are selected conservatively based on flight safety, but a higher 
frequency of scheduled maintenance increases O&M cost and may make it more likely 
that the maintenance actions themselves introduce system faults.  Performing 
maintenance tasks in a timely manner, with reduced cost and improved safety, is 
critically important for successful operation of any system, especially as resources are 
becoming scarce.   Examining the military aerospace field, one notes that many legacy 
systems are or will be operating beyond their original design life due to funding delays or 
schedule slips associated with new replacement aircraft. Life extension programs have 
often been implemented on these legacy systems so that they can operate safely and 
effectively until a replacement system is available.  
Even with a life extension program, however, operating a legacy system can incur 
significant operations and support costs. One of the major concerns for aging aircraft is 
the structural health of the system. As the structure accumulates flight hours, cracks 
develop and propagate in that structure. In response, Non-Destructive Inspections (NDI) 
are used by the maintenance crews to find these cracks and perform maintenance if they 
grow beyond what is considered a safe length. These NDI are preformed periodically, 
usually based on flight hours. These inspections have some negative aspects associated 
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with them. NDI cause aircraft down time affecting mission readiness, and increasing 
labor hours and maintenance costs. Further, between NDI intervals the length of the 
existing cracks in the structure are not known, which raises safety concerns. Condition-
Based Maintenance (CBM) has been investigated in recent years to overcome these 
shortcomings by performing maintenance when needed as opposed to relying on more 
conservative maintenance intervals (Cutter and Thompson, 2005; Ellis, 2008). 
One of the necessary tools to achieve CBM is to continuously monitor the system. 
Structure Health Monitoring (SHM) is an approach that employs methods and tools to 
monitor the health of the structure continuously through on-board sensors, promising 
higher safety level and reduction in cost through extended inspection intervals and 
continuous monitoring. Many of the necessary SHM technologies are available, yet we 
see a slow implementation of these systems on operational platforms. It has been 
suggested that the lack of a solid business case clearly analyzing the cost benefit of a 
SHM system is one of the main causes of the slow implementation of such a system 
(Derriso et al., 2007; Perez et al., 2010). Further, challenges involved in the development 
and transition of SHM technology including issues concerned with design, installations 
and validation methods for damage detection are still present (Beard and Banerjee, 2011). 
False Alarms (FA) from a SHM system will cause unnecessary maintenance actions, thus 
raising cost and aircraft availability concerns. Further, Missed detections from a SHM 
system can cause safety concerns. 
Degradation of the SHM system over the life time of an aircraft can have a great 
impact on the SHM system performance, adversely effecting FA and Miss Detection 
events. Many studies show degradation of SHM sensors over time due to static loads, 
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cyclic loads, temperature and corrosion. Research by Achenbach (2007) indicated that 
some of the technical challenges for sensors are that they need to be small, autonomous, 
cheap, robust, repairable, accurate, densely distributed, measure local and system level 
responses and designed to measure relevant damage parameters. There are typically 
competing objectives that must be balanced by the system designer. Beard et al. (2005) 
found that environmental conditions such as temperature can affect the signal obtained 
from sensors. His research used calibration to compensate for temperature variation based 
on the structure and application. A sensor diagnostics and validation process was 
presented by Park et al. (2006). It performs in situ monitoring of the operational status of 
a piezoelectric (PZT) active-sensor in SHM applications. Both degradation of the 
mechanical/electrical properties of a PZT transducer and the bonding defects between a 
PZT patch and a host structure could be identified by the proposed process. The proposed 
process can provide a metric that can be used to determine the sensor functionality over a 
long period of service time or after an extreme loading event.  An investigation on the 
effect of cyclic loads on sensor performance was conducted by Kuhn (2009). Degradation 
was identified in sensor performance having a direct relationship with cyclic strain which 
was estimated by using a power equation model in his research. A probability of 
detection (POD) degradation model was also developed to show the overall performance 
of a SHM system over time. 
It is clear that these factors have a major impact on the business case. A benefit 
study that considers fatigue crack growth rates, realistic probability of detection, SHM 
sensor degradation, scheduled inspection intervals, SHM maintenance actions, and Life 
cycle analysis and operation events is needed. This research is a follow on work of 
52 
 
Albinali and Jacques (2014). The novelty of this research described herein is the benefit 
study and analysis for a legacy fighter equipped with a SHM system that degrades 
throughout the life cycle. SHM sensor degradation and its effect on operation and 
maintenance events is considered. Realistic fatigue crack growth rates and probability of 
detection is employed. Modeling and simulation using Monte Carlo analysis in the 
MATLAB® programming environment is used to model the operational life of an aircraft 
equipped with a degrading SHM system, and the potential impact of that system on life 
cycle maintenance events. 
Crack propagation model 
Fatigue crack growth predictions are used to estimate the design life of aircraft 
structural components. They are used in design where a structural component is 
expected to operate safely with an existing crack until the crack reaches a length that is 
detectable by NDI, but less than a critical length (Roylance, 2001). Paris’s Law is one of 
the most widely used fatigue crack growth models and was used in this research effort 
(Paris and Erdogan, 1963). 
Paris’s Law 
Under a fatigue stress regime Paris’s Law relates sub-critical crack growth to 
stress intensity factor. The basic formula has the following form: 
 
𝑑𝑎
𝑑𝑁
= 𝐶∆𝐾𝑚                                                               (9) 
 
The term on the left side is known as the crack growth rate, where 𝑎 is the crack 
length and 𝑁 is the number of load cycles. The crack growth rate indicates the crack 
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length growth per accumulated number of load cycles. 𝐶 and 𝑚 are material constants 
and ∆𝐾 is the difference between the stress intensity factor at maximum loading and 
minimum loading: 
 
∆𝐾 = 𝐾𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝐾𝑚𝑖𝑛 =  ∆𝛿√𝜋𝑎                                             (10) 
 
where 𝐾𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the maximum stress intensity factor, 𝐾𝑚𝑖𝑛 is the minimum stress 
intensity factor and ∆δ is the pressure differential due to the stress load. 
Fatigue crack growth subroutine 
A fatigue crack growth subroutine model was developed to simulate the crack 
length propagation in every sortie. By integrating the Paris model Equation 9 and solving 
for 𝑎𝑖 which is the crack length after 𝑁𝑖 cycles (flights) we get (An et al., 2012): 
 
𝑎𝑖 = �𝑁𝑖𝐶 �1 − 𝑚2� �∆𝛿√𝜋�𝑚 + 𝑎01−𝑚2 � 22−𝑚                               (11) 
 
where 𝑎0 is assumed to be the initial flaw size (crack length) existing in a new or 
repaired structural component (Heida and Grooteman, 1998). Uncertainty is applied to 
the value of 𝑎0 to reflect that this value is different every time a repair or replacement is 
done to the structure. The pressure differential, ∆δ, due to the stress load can be 
evaluated by using the expression (An et al., 2012): 
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∆𝛿 = 𝐾𝐼𝐶
�𝑎𝑐𝑟𝜋
                                                         (12) 
 
where 𝐾𝐼𝐶 is the fracture toughness, a material property provided by the manufacturer of 
the structural component. ∆δ is modeled with uncertainty to simulate the variation in 
loads an aircraft structure is exposed to after a repair or replacement of structural 
component.  
Crack detection model 
Probability of detection (POD) 
The primary focus of a SHM system is to reliably detect a significant crack 
length 𝑎 just like the NDI, but to perform this task continuously during operation of the 
system. The performance of a SHM system can be demonstrated using 𝑃𝑂𝐷(𝑎) curves. 
Kuhn and Soni (2009) and Kuhn (2009) showed that 𝑃𝑂𝐷(𝑎) can be evaluated using 
the following formula: 
 
𝑃𝑂𝐷(𝑎) = 𝑃(𝑎 � > 𝑎�𝑡ℎ) = 𝛷 �𝛽0+𝛽1∗ln(𝑎)−ln(𝑎�𝑡ℎ)𝜎 �                      (13) 
 
𝑃𝑂𝐷(𝑎) is modeled by performing linear regression on an 𝑎 vs. 𝑎 �  functional 
relation that has normally distributed residuals with constant variance, where 𝑎 �  is the 
measured system response of a NDI system to a crack of length 𝑎. Units depend on the 
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particular inspection system. MIL-HDBK-1823 (Department of Defense, 1999), 
describes NDI experimental data showing a linear regression line relationship relating 
ln(𝑎) to ln(𝑎 �), where 𝛽0 is the regression line intercept, 𝛽1 is the slope, 𝑎�𝑡ℎ is the signal 
threshold for a NDI system (the value of  𝑎 �  below which the signal is determined to 
have been caused by a crack of insignificant length) and 𝜎 is the standard deviation of 
the residuals of a linear regression fit of 𝑎 vs. 𝑎 �  data. A more intuitive explanation of 
the generation of the POD equation showing practitioners how properties of SHM data 
affect the rotation and translation of the POD curve was pressed by Pado et al. (2013). 
In an SHM system using piezoelectric sensors (PZT) using pitch-catch signals we get a 
smaller signal response 𝑎 �  for a greater crack length 𝑎.  This is opposite to NDI where a 
greater signal response 𝑎 �  for a greater crack length 𝑎. The PZT POD relationship is 
represented in Equation 14 and Figure 10 (Kuhn, 2009). 
 
𝑃𝑂𝐷(𝑎) = 𝑃(𝑎�𝑡ℎ > 𝑎 �) = 𝛷 �ln(𝑎�𝑡ℎ)−𝛽0−𝛽1∗ln(𝑎)𝜎 �                              (14) 
 
Figure 10: Linear regression fit of ln(𝑎) vs. ln(𝑎 �) data for SHM using PZT sensors (Kuhn, 
2009)  
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Confusion Matrix 
In a scenario where an NDI or SHM system is attempting binary detection 
(crack/no-crack) of a crack of length 𝑎 there are four possible outcomes: 
  
1)  The system detects a crack and a crack of significant length actually   
 exists, thus declared a True Detection event; 
2) The system detects a crack and either the crack does not exist or the length of 
 the crack is not considered significant, thus declared a FA event; 
3) The system does not detect a crack and a crack of significant length does not 
 exist, thus declared a True Negative event; 
4) The system does not detect a crack but a crack of significant length exists; this 
 is a Missed Detection event. 
 
These four probabilities can be represented in a “Confusion Matrix” shown in 
Figure 11 (Fawcett, 2006).  The confusion matrix is used for predictive analysis. 
Typically, the probabilities appearing in the matrix are determined through test or 
historical data collection.   
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Figure 11: Confusion Matrix 
 
A graphical representation of the confusion matrix probability distributions with 
the threshold level of an SHM system is represented in Figure 12. In operating an 
aircraft, FA rates or false calls (shaded part of the no damage distribution plot to the left 
of 𝑎�𝑡ℎ) raise concerns due to the fact that these will drive unnecessary maintenance 
actions that will affect mission readiness and cost.  Even beyond concerns for 
unnecessary maintenance actions, false alarms could result in premature mission 
terminations.  Missed Detections (un-shaded part of the damage distribution plot to the 
right of 𝑎�𝑡ℎ) raise concerns due to the fact that they might cause an aircraft mishap due 
to unforeseen/undetected structural problems.  
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Figure 12: Graphical representation of the probabilities and Threshold detection Level 
Probability of detection with degradation 
A probability of detection (POD) simulation subroutine was developed to 
simulate the SHM system response to a crack length occurring for every sortie following 
a normal distribution. A probability of detection of the threshold crack 𝑎𝑡ℎ, detected 
50% of the time, will be evaluated using Equation 13 in the following form: 
 
𝑃𝑂𝐷(𝑎) = 0.5 = 𝛷 �ln(𝑎�𝑡ℎ)−𝛽0−𝛽1∗ln(𝑎𝑡ℎ)
𝜎
�                                            (15) 
 
The signal threshold 𝑎�𝑡ℎwill be solved for and used in the following equation by (Kuhn, 
2009): 
 
𝑃𝑂𝐷(𝑎)𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑 = 𝛷 �ln(𝑎�𝑡ℎ)−(𝛽0∗𝛼)−(𝛽1∗𝛾)∗ln(𝑎)𝜎∗𝜓 �                                        (16) 
 
where the crack length 𝑎 from the fatigue crack growth simulation will be used and a 
Monte Carlo draw will be performed every sortie. The constants 𝛽0, 𝛽1and σ are 
evaluated by performing linear regression on experimental data provided by MIL-
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HDBK-1823 (Department of Defense, 1999). The variables 𝑎𝑡ℎ (set equal to 10% of 
𝑎𝑐𝑟) and 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 (set equal to 5% of 𝑎𝑐𝑟) are held constant for all runs, but α, γ and ψ are 
varied for different simulation runs as a percentage of 𝛽0, 𝛽1and σ , respectively. While 
𝑎𝑡ℎ and 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒  were kept constant relative to 𝑎𝑐𝑟 for this research, previous research has 
investigated the effect of varying them relative to 𝑎𝑐𝑟 (Albinali and Jacques, 2014).   
The previous discussion pertains to the constant 𝑎�𝑡ℎ case. For the variable 
threshold case the threshold was adjusted to maintain a 50% detection as follows: 
 
0.5= 𝛷 �ln(𝑎�𝑡ℎ)−(𝛽0∗𝛼)−(𝛽1∗𝛾)∗ln(𝑎)
𝜎∗𝜓
�                    (17) 
 
Using Equation 17, 𝑎�𝑡ℎ was calculated with different degradation factors to always 
maintain a 50% detection threshold. Then the calculated 𝑎�𝑡ℎwas used in Equation 16. 
This caused 𝑎�𝑡ℎ to be reduced, i.e. move to the left, as was described in Figure 12. For 
the varying threshold case with uncertain degradation level 20% uncertainty was applied 
to degradation factors α, γ and ψ in Equation 16 and the simulation was repeated to see 
the effect of varying the threshold with uncertainty. 
It is important to note that FA and True Detection are competing objectives, and 
for a given detection system both cannot be simultaneously improved. It can be 
observed from Figure 4 that false alarms are calculated from the (no damage) 
distribution, and if sensor degradation occurs the distribution shifts to the left (no 
damage-degradation) due to a change in the mean, or a spreading of the distribution 
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occurs due to a change in standard deviation (assuming a constant threshold), resulting 
in more false alarms. It also can be observed from Figure 13 the missed detection 
portion of the (damage) probability distribution is the unshaded portion to the right of 
𝑎�𝑡ℎ.  If sensor degradation occurs the distribution shifts to the left (damaged-
degradation) due to change in the mean of the distribution (again assuming a constant 
threshold detection threshold), resulting in less missed detections. For a static crack with 
a>ath , a spreading of the distributions in Figure 13 without a change in the mean could 
potentially result in an increase in both FA events and Missed Detections (given a static 
threshold) due to greater overlap between the damage and no damage distributions.  
However, when considered with cracks that transition from a<asafe to a larger value, the 
POD(asafe<a<ath) distributions lie to the right of the 𝑎�𝑡ℎ line, and it will be shown that 
this results in a drop in the number of Missed Detections.  If a moving threshold is 
considered, the threshold will need to move to the left with the mean of the POD(ath) 
distribution in order to counter the effect of increased FAs.  While FA probability in the 
(no damage-degradation) distribution will be reduced (the intended result), the Miss 
Detection probability in the (damaged-degradation) distribution will increase over the 
corresponding amount that would be seen with a constant threshold.  
 
61 
 
 
Figure 13: Graphical representation of the probabilities and Threshold detection 
Level with Degradation 
 
In this research, the effect of a crack growth on a legacy fighter will be simulated 
for each sortie up to the time when a mishap (catastrophic failure) occurs or the end of 
the design life of the aircraft is reached, whichever occurs first. For every sortie, 
corresponding to a set number of load cycles, SHM system detection will be simulated 
based on the current crack size and sensor performance (POD(a)) / degradation 
(POD(a)Degraded). For this analysis, the SHM system will be assumed to follow an SHM-
like detection trend using PZT sensors, whereby a larger crack will generate a smaller 
mean signal response. An event corresponding to one of the quadrants of the confusion 
matrix will occur at each sortie.   
• A true detection event will trigger an inspection and a repair action will 
occur;  
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• An FA event triggering an inspection can occur. For an FA event, 
subsequent NDI will identify the true crack size.  In this research, NDI 
performed post-flight is assumed to be perfect;  
• A Missed Detection event triggering the possibility of a mishap can 
occur.  A missed detection of a crack that is still less than some defined 
critical length will not cause a mishap; however, missed detection of a 
crack that grows to a length equal to or exceeding a critical length will 
result in a mishap;  
• Finally, a true negative event triggers no action, and the aircraft is 
assumed ready for the next sortie.  
Varying the sensor detection POD(a)Degraded due to degradation by varying the 
degradation factors where α is the degradation factor applied to the regression line 
intercept β0, γ is the degradation factor applied to the regression line slope β1, ψ is the 
degradation factor applied to the regression line standard deviation σ. For this research, a 
single critical crack location is modeled, but the methods described herein are extensible 
to multiple crack locations. 
Structural health monitoring model 
Modeling and simulation using MATLAB® was the method used in this 
research. Figure 23 shows an event flow diagram depicting SHM related events for a 
legacy aircraft equipped with SHM system. 
The simulation model starts at takeoff, depicted on the bottom left side of Figure 
14. To initialize the model, a threshold, 𝑎�𝑡ℎ, and safe crack length,  𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒, are set and 
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kept for the lifetime of the aircraft. An uncertain initial flaw size is used to initialize the 
crack growth model based on the Paris model discussed previously (Paris and Erdogan, 
1963). After takeoff, the model generates a probability distribution for the crack length 
in that specific sortie based on the growth model and the number of accumulated flight 
hours in service or since previous crack repair.  
 
 
Figure 14: Flow diagram for SHM equipped aircraft 
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It is shown in Figure 15 that every run has a different 𝑎0 and growth rate 
(corresponding to variation in loads, ∆δ) causing the crack to propagate differently after 
each replacement or repair. Also a representation of 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 , the minimum crack 
considered to be significant for SHM monitoring, is shown on the figure. Detected 
cracks of length smaller than 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 are not repaired.  The figure also shows 𝑎𝑡ℎ, a crack 
size having an associated SHM response designated as the threshold for detection, 𝑎�𝑡ℎ. 
The parameters 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 and  𝑎𝑡ℎ were set at 5% and 10% of 𝑎𝑐𝑟 respectively for this 
research, but earlier research explored variations of 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 and  𝑎𝑡ℎ with respect to acr  
(Albinali and Jacques, 2014).  
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Figure 15: Fatigue crack growth simulation results for 10 runs 
 
At each sortie, a Monte Carlo draw is initiated simulating SHM system detection. 
If the system response signal 𝑎� is greater than 𝑎�𝑡ℎ no SHM detection occurred. The 
model will check if the crack length 𝑎 is greater than the critical crack length, 𝑎𝑐𝑟. If that 
is true the model will declare a catastrophic structure failure leading to an aircraft mishap. 
Otherwise the aircraft will land. If no catastrophic failure occurs, the model will check if 
𝑎 is greater than 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒, and if that is true a missed detection event will be recorded. Note 
that while missed detections are recorded in the simulation for later analysis, the SHM 
66 
 
system has no knowledge that a missed detection has occurred. If the aircraft reached its 
maximum life the simulation run for this aircraft will end and a new simulation run will 
start; otherwise, the model will propagate the crack length and degrade the SHM sensors 
by the amount simulated for one sortie and takeoff again. For any sortie, if 𝑎 �  is less than 
𝑎�𝑡ℎ, SHM detection occurs and the sortie will be aborted. An inspection will occur and if 
𝑎 is greater than 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒, a true detection event will be recorded. The crack length will be 
reset simulating a repair or a replacement of a structural component and the aircraft will 
take off again. If 𝑎 is less than 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒, a FA event will be recorded, the crack 𝑎 will be 
propagated, SHM sensors will be degraded, and the aircraft will take off again. If the 
number of FA events reach a maximum number identified FAmax between SHM 
scheduled maintenance intervals, the crack 𝑎 will be propagated, SHM sensors will be 
replaced resetting the POD(a)Degraded, and the aircraft will take off again. This will 
continue until the end of design life or catastrophic failure of the aircraft. For a given set 
of α, γ and ψ, 100 simulation runs will be performed, each one having a randomly 
selected initial flaw size and growth rate parameter. After that a different set of α, γ and ψ 
will be used so trade space analysis on the affect of SHM sensor degradation and crack 
length on events can be performed.  
Parameter Values and Recorded Events 
The main simulation routine tallies several different events for the tradespace 
analysis. The number of FA events and Miss Detection events are recorded for different 
sets of α, γ and ψ. For each combination of α, γ and ψ, 100 simulation runs will 
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conducted and the average FA and Miss Detection events will be calculated. The results 
will be displayed and discussed in the following section. 
Results and Discussion 
Fixed detection threshold 
Figure 16 displays the effect of degradation in the intercept, slope and standard 
deviation on the average number of Miss Detection events. Every point on the graph 
represents one life of an aircraft simulated by 100 iterations. It is observed from Figure 
16 that as the degradation factors α, γ and ψ are increased a significant drop in the 
number of Miss Detection events is noticed. The greater the degradation of α, γ and ψ, 
the lower the number of Miss Detection events recorded. While fewer missed detections 
is a desirable outcome, this is at the expense of a significant increase in the number of 
FA events.  Figure 17 displays the effect of degradation in the intercept, slope and 
standard deviation on the average number of FA events. Again, every point on the graph 
represents one life of an aircraft simulated by 100 iterations. It is observed from Figure 
17 that as the degradation factors α, γ and ψ are increased a significant increase in the 
number of Miss Detection events is noticed. The greater α, γ and ψ percentage the 
greater the number of FA events recorded. We notice the degradation in standard 
deviation does not show a significant increase in FA events for the ranges shown; 
however, Kuhn’s (2009) experimental data showed that degradation could cause up to 
400% degradation in the standard deviation. This was implemented in the simulation 
and showed an average of 50 FA events at 400% degradation in the standard deviation. 
Confidence intervals of 95% are shown on all figures.  
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Figure 16: Degradation in the Intercept, Slope and Standard Deviation vs. Average 
number of Miss Detection Events 
 
 
Figure 17: Degradation in the Intercept, Slope and Standard Deviation vs. Average 
number of FA Events 
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Figure 18 displays the effect of degradation in the intercept and standard 
deviation while keeping the slope constant (non-degraded) to see the effect of combined 
factors on the average number of Miss Detection events. From Figure 18 we observe 
that as the degradation factors α and ψ are increased a significant drop in the number of 
Miss Detection events is noticed, and combining both factors causes an even greater 
decrease in the Miss Detection events. Figure 19 displays the effect of degradation in the 
intercept and standard deviation while keeping the slope constant to see the effect of 
combined factors on the average number of FA events. From Figure 19 we observe that 
as the degradation factors α and ψ are increased a significant increase in the number of 
FA events is noticed where combining both factor will cause even greater increase in the 
FA events.  Considering that FA events trigger unnecessary and costly maintenance 
events, this increase in the FA rate would be unacceptable for fielded system. 
 
Figure 18: Degradation in Intercept and Standard Deviation vs. Average number of Miss 
Detection events 
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Figure 19: Degradation in Intercept and Standard Deviation vs. Average number 
of FA events 
 
Figure 20 displays the effect of degradation in the intercept and standard 
deviation while keeping the slope at a constant 30% degradation to see the effect of 
combined all factors on the average number of Miss Detection events. From Figure 20 
we observe that the same trend demonstrated in Figure 20 is evident, but combined 
degradation of all factors results in an even greater decrease in the Miss Detection 
events. The greater α and ψ percentage, the lower the number of Miss Detection events 
recorded. Figure 21 displays the effect of degradation in the intercept and standard 
deviation while keeping the slope also at constant 30% degradation to see the effect of 
combined factors on the average number of FA events. The trend from Figure 10 is 
repeated in Figure 21 but with a greater increase in FA events resulting from the 
combined degradation factors. 
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Figure 20: Degradation in Intercept, Standard Deviation and Slope at 30% Degradation 
vs. Average number of Miss Detection events 
 
 
Figure 21: Degradation in Intercept, Standard Deviation and Slope at 30% Degradation 
vs. Average number of FA events 
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Setting 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 to 5% of 𝑎𝑐𝑟 and 𝑎𝑡ℎ to 10% 𝑎𝑐𝑟 did not result in any simulated 
catastrophic failure leading to loss of aircraft in this study. This is true for all simulated 
events with varying threshold and varying degradation factors effect. Recall that a 
Missed Detection event does not typically result in a catastrophic failure because the 
SHM system continues to have opportunities for detection for each sortie.  As long as 
the crack growth rate is sufficiently slow it will typically get detected during a later 
sortie.  Figure 22 represents degradation in the slope effect versus average crack length 
detected after a Miss Detection event. The crack detected after miss detection is 
acceptably small relative to the critical crack length. Effect of setting different 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 and 
𝑎𝑡ℎ values was demonstrated in a previous study (Albinali and Jacques, 2014). 
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Figure 22: Degradation in the Slope vs. Average crack length after a Miss 
Detection event 
 
Varying detection threshold 
Figures 23 and 24 display the effect of degradation in the intercept to observe the 
effect of a variable threshold on the SHM system performance. From Figure 23 we 
observe that as the degradation factor α is increased, a significant increase in the number 
of FA events occurs for the constant threshold case as shown before. Varying the 
threshold according to assumed degradation models serves to stem the growth of FA 
events, thus avoiding the unnecessary and costly maintenance events.  Even for the case 
of a variable threshold, random error associated with the assumed intercept degradation 
factor while the number of FA events is higher than the ideal case in which the intercept 
degradation factor is known, that FA event growth is still halted at a far lower value than 
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that experienced by the system with a constant threshold which continues to grow for 
higher values of the intercept degradation factor.  
  
Figure 23: Degradation in the Intercept vs. Average FA events for threshold being 
constant, varying and varying with random degrading Slop factor 
 
From Figure 24 we observe that as the intercept degradation factor α is increased 
a significant drop in the number of Miss Detection events occurs for the constant 
threshold case as shown previously. If the threshold is varied a relatively constant 
number of Miss Detection events are recoded. This is a result of the constant drop in 
mean of the regression line in Figure 13 and moving the threshold to maintain a 50% 
detection level based on assumed degradation levels. If the threshold is varied but the 
assumed intercept degradation factor has random error associated with it, a lower 
number of Miss Detection events are recorded, but with a cost of more FA events as 
discussed previously.  
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Figure 24: Degradation in the Intercept vs. Average Miss Detection events for threshold 
being constant, varying and varying with random degrading Slope factor 
 
Figures 25 and 26 show the benefit of a variable detection threshold in the 
presence of degradation in the slope of the POD curve. From Figure 25 we observe that 
as the degradation factor γ is increased, a significant increase in the number of FA 
events occurs for the constant threshold case, again as shown previously. As in the case 
for the degrading intercept factor, a variable threshold serves to restrain the growth in 
FA events to a manageable case, even when there is random error associated with the 
assumed degradation factor.  
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Figure 25: Degradation in the Slope vs. Average FA events for threshold being constant, 
varying and varying with random degrading Slope factor 
 
From Figure 26 we observe that as the degradation factor α is increased a 
significant drop in the number of Miss Detection occurs for the constant threshold case, 
as shown previously. With a variable threshold there is a proportional drop in the 
number of Miss Detection events as the slope is degraded. This is a result of the 
proportional drop in mean of the regression line in Figure 13 and moving the threshold 
to maintain a 50% detection level. If the threshold is varying with random error 
associated with the assumed slope degradation factor it is observed that lower 
proportional Miss Detection events are recorded.  
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Figure 26: Degradation in the Slope vs. Average Miss Detection events for threshold 
being constant, varying and varying with random degrading Slope factor 
 
Figures 27 and 28 show the impact on SHM performance for the cases of known 
and uncertain degradation in the standard deviation of the POD curve. In this case, no 
movement in the threshold occurs because the mean of the associated distribution is 
stationary. From Figure 27 we observe that the known degradation factor ψ results in a 
significant increase in the number of FA events as shown before. If the standard 
deviation is increased with a random degradation factor it is observed that a higher 
number of FA events are recorded. The increasing spread of the POD distribution for 
cracks smaller than the asafe will cause a greater proportion of that distribution to fall 
below 𝑎�𝑡ℎ, resulting in more FA events. From Figure 28 we observe that as the 
degradation factor ψ increases, a significant drop in the number of Miss Detection 
events is recorded. To understand this trend, one needs to consider the distribution for 
POD(asafe<a<ath).  For a piezo-like sensor this distribution is centered on an 𝑎� > 𝑎�𝑡ℎ, 
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but the spreading of this distribution will cause a greater proportion to fall below 𝑎�𝑡ℎ .  
This represents correctly detected cracks; an increase in the proportion of correctly 
detected cracks (for a given crack size) can only occur if there is a complementary 
reduction in Missed Detections.  If the standard deviation is increased with a random 
degradation factor it is observed that lower Miss Detection events are recorded. This is 
due to the uncertainty in the standard deviation degradation factor.  As in the prior 
degradation cases, one notes that uncertainty in the standard deviation degradation 
parameter adversely affects the FA rate, but has a positive effect on Missed Detections 
(lower numbers). 
 
Figure 27: Degradation in the Standard Deviation vs. Average FA events for threshold 
being constant and varying 
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Figure 28: Degradation in the Standard Deviation vs. Average Miss Detection events for 
threshold being constant and varying 
 
Conclusions and recommendations 
Although installing an SHM system with a certain expected performance might 
produce expected cost savings, better operational readiness and improved safety, the 
SHM system degradation will be a concern. Any system installed on an aircraft is likely 
to degrade with operation. Systems installed on aircraft typically require maintenance 
and inspection schedules to ensure continued acceptable operation. The same is true for 
the SHM system. This work studied the affect of degradation on SHM performance 
parameters on the FA and Miss Detection events an aircraft might experience The 
tradespace analysis approach described herein shows how SHM sensor degradation 
factors α and γ can affect the number of FA and Missed Detections events that could 
occur over the expected life of an aircraft. With increased degradation while keeping a 
constant threshold a high number of false alarms will result, with a subsequent increase 
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in maintenance events and cost. On the other hand if the threshold is varied to overcome 
the degradation effect, lower FA events will occur with an increase in Miss Detection 
events. Further, varying the threshold with a random degradation factor lowers false 
alarms but less effective that the previous case. Also, the standard deviation degradation 
factor ψ can affect the number of FA and Missed Detections events that could occur 
over the expected life of an aircraft. With increased degradation while keeping a 
constant threshold a high number of false alarms will result, with a subsequent increase 
in maintenance events and cost. Further, varying the threshold with a random 
degradation factor increases false alarms but reduces Miss Detection events. With safety 
of flight as a primary consideration, the SHM system sensor parameters 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒, 𝑎�𝑡ℎ and 
degradation parameters α, γ and ψ can be adjusted to reduce the probability of mishap 
events to an acceptably low level while also keeping FA rates, and related maintenance 
costs, at an acceptable level while mitigating the degradation effects.  
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Conclusions of Research 
There are a number of important conclusions that arose as a result of this research 
topic. The key conclusions can be summarized as follows: 
• Setting the SHM system design parameters very conservatively (closer to 
safe crack levels) increases detection but causes a high number of FA 
events; 
• Setting the SHM system threshold higher to tolerate a greater crack length 
reduces FA events but increases the number of Miss Detection events; 
• As cracks propagate to a greater length it was observed that Miss 
Detection events can lead to catastrophic failures; 
• Degradation in SHM PZT-Like sensors (POD mean) while keeping a 
constant threshold will result in a high number of false alarms, with a 
subsequent increase in maintenance events and cost; 
• If the threshold is varied to overcome degradation effects, lower numbers 
of FA events will occur with a concurrent increase in Miss Detection 
events; 
• Varying the threshold in the presence of random degradation factor lowers 
false alarms as compared to the constant threshold case, but less 
effectively than would be achieved with perfect knowledge of the 
degradation factors; 
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• The standard deviation degradation factor can affect the number of FA and 
Missed Detections events that could occur over the expected life of an 
aircraft. With increased degradation a high number of false alarms will 
result, with a subsequent increase in maintenance events and cost;  
• Varying the threshold in the presence of a random degradation factor  
associated with the standard deviation causes a greater increase in false 
alarms but a reduction in Miss Detection events is observed.  
Significance of research 
This research provided a life cycle analysis for a legacy aircraft equipped with 
SHM system with expected events (FA, Miss Detections) that could impact the life cycle 
and cost-benefit analysis. This was accomplished by combining the method used in MIL-
HDBK-1823 and Paris’s model and integrating it into a life cycle model reflecting 
changing crack size, with detection and sensor degradation in every flight sortie until the 
end of the life of the aircraft. This enables users to estimate the frequency of event 
occurrences and the costs associated with these events, thus contributing to a more 
accurate life cycle cost (LCC) basis for an aircraft equipped with an SHM system. 
This research developed a decision support model to explore the tradespace 
associated with implementation of an SHM system on aging aircraft. This model was able 
to capture representative crack propagation with respect to accumulated flight hours, and 
it captured representative performance of SHM sensors as influenced by SHM detection 
thresholds and acceptable crack lengths.  The model provided the capability for system 
sensor parameters to be adjusted to reduce the probability of mishap events to an 
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acceptably low level while also keeping FA rates, and related maintenance costs, at an 
acceptable level. This is significant for system design requirement.  The model provided 
the capability to capture representative changes in detection of SHM sensors due to 
degradation as a result of accumulated flight hours.  Representative maintenance events 
(both scheduled and unscheduled) and aircraft unavailability encountered due to 
structural or sensor maintenance (or replacement of the SHM system) can also be 
captured from the model. This will provide a better basis for a LCC estimate as sensor 
degradation and SHM system unscheduled maintenance is taken into consideration. 
The model also investigated the utility and effect of employing a variable 
threshold for countering the effect of degrading SHM sensors. This resulted in better 
SHM performance when compared to the static threshold case (significantly lower 
numbers of FA events), while maintaining levels of Miss Detection within acceptable 
limits. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
With respect for future tasks, there are a number of tasks that could be 
investigated. For this research, a single critical crack location is modeled, but the methods 
described herein are extensible to multiple crack locations, and future work is 
recommended to extend the model to accommodate them. Further, this method 
investigated damage in metallic structures, and has not been adapted for damage 
detection in composite panels where the extent of the damage is an area (compared to 
crack length). In order to adapt the model for modeling damage detection in composite 
structures, an analytic model for sensors capable of detecting composite damage will be 
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required.  As long as experimental data can show and reflect a relationship between 
existing damage characteristics/severity and signal response the SHM system model 
could be extended to include this type of damage detection. It is recommended that future 
work extend the model to investigate damage in composite structures.   
While cost drivers such as maintenance and/or repair events were captured in the 
current model, a true LCC analysis was not performed.  Representative cost/event data 
could be used with the post processed data from the existing model to perform a cost-
benefit analysis associated with monitoring aircraft structural hot spots.   
Finally, a longer term goal should be to consider structural health monitoring 
within the larger scope of integrated system health monitoring and condition based 
maintenance.  This will significantly increase the scope of the model, but many of the 
lower level sub-models associated with specific monitoring types/locations and/or the 
maintenance and supply chain are maturing and may be available for integration into the 
larger model. 
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Appendix 
Model Inputs and Outputs  
Table 1 Lists model inputs and Table 2 List Model outputs. Some outputs like 
the average unscheduled maintenance events can be used in the future once a cost and 
time required by these events is available. This will allow the model to have a better 
LCC estimates.  
Table 1. SHM Model Inputs 
Description Value 
𝑎𝑐𝑟 = critical crack length at which failure occurs 4.744 mm 
𝑎0 = initial flaw size (crack length) 0.1778 mm 
𝛽1 = regression line slope 1.4195 
𝛽0 = regression line intercept 7.5271 
𝐶 = material constant 1.5e-10 
𝐾𝐼𝐶  = fracture toughness 53 𝑃𝑎√𝑚  
 
𝑚 = material constant 4.6 
𝑁  = number of load cycles 200,000 
𝜎  =standard deviation associated with probability of 𝑎� given 𝑎 0.38221 
Aircraft scheduled Maintenance 1000 Hrs 
Aircraft total life 8000 Hrs 
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SHM system scheduled Maintenance 2000Hrs 
Total Flight sorties 2000 
Single sortie 4 Hrs 
 
Table 2. SHM Model Outputs 
Description 
𝑎 = crack length at each sortie 
Average number of catastrophic failures leading to loss of aircraft 
Average number of True Detection events 
Average number of False Alarm events 
Average number of Miss detection events 
Average number of True Negative events 
Average crack length detected after a Miss Detection event 
Average number of aircraft unscheduled repairs 
Average number of aircraft unscheduled inspections 
Average number of SHM system unscheduled repairs/sensor replacement 
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The following is a conference paper titled (Integrated Health Monitoring for 
Aircraft-A Literature Review and Gap Analysis) presented to the Conference on Systems 
Engineering Research (CSER) 2011. It covers a detailed literature search of the 
Integrated Health Monitoring research area. 
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Abstract 
This paper is a literature review and gap analysis for Integrated Health Monitoring 
(IHM) systems focused on aircraft application. Some of the main challenges slowing the 
implementation of an IHM system are technology performance, implementation issues 
and a solid business case. False alarms that could be produced from this system can cause 
more maintenance than needed, and the large amount of data produced from monitoring 
needs improved statistical tools to clearly identify defects without false alarms. Durability 
and robustness are additional technology performance issues for an IHM system. Design 
of an IHM system should be part of a systems engineering framework that integrates 
health monitoring and maintenance with all other requirements for the system. In the near 
future an IHM system could be implemented on aging aircraft to monitor known failure 
modes. Longer term, the use of an IHM system on new aircraft could result in monitoring 
the full system in real time. Application of IHM to new military jets has started to appear, 
but implementation in aging aircraft is lagging far behind. The presentation of a solid 
business case for the IHM system is a great challenge and arguably is the main factor 
contributing to the slow implementation of this technology.  
 
Introduction 
IHM for aircraft is a research area that could lead to a major change in the way we 
manage the health of our fleet in the future. Relatively few IHM systems are in operation 
on aircraft today. A review and a gap analysis of some of the relevant IHM literature lead 
us to identify the current challenges facing the implementation of an IHM system.  Some 
of the main IHM system’s challenges are the technology performance, implementation 
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issues and a solid business case. The presentation of a solid business case for such a 
system is considered very important as this challenge has a great impact on the decision 
to implement an IHM on an operational aircraft. 
A perspective of the structural mechanics program of the Air Force Office of 
Scientific Research on structural health monitoring (SHM) and non-destructive 
evaluation (NDE) was presented by (Giurgiutiu, 2008). NDE and SHM have an essential 
role in the operational readiness and safety of the Air Force fleet. Considerable 
challenges face the operators and the maintainers due to aging aircrafts. NDE techniques 
have proven to be reliable in detecting damage during phase inspections due to their 
maturity. SHM has great potential due to its on board sensors and systems that provide 
structural health assessment on demand. In particular, the study indicated a desire to use 
SHM to provide remaining life prognosis and quantifying structural variability.  This 
study concludes that considerable applied and fundamental research is needed to develop, 
integrate and implement SHM technology. 
 
Technology Performance 
Much research in the field of IHM for aircraft has been motivated by the promise 
of increased performance, reduction of life cycle cost and increased availability. Yet we 
still have gaps that slow the implementation of IHM systems. Many believe that the 
current maturity level for IHM technology falls short of what is required for fielded 
implementation. In a research on SHM by (Derriso et al., 2007)  technical feasibility is 
described as facing three fundamental challenges: small-scale damage must be detected 
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in relatively large-scale structures, SHM systems must work in an unsupervised learning 
mode, and the SHM system must be robust and reliable.  
 
Reliability  
False alarms from an IHM system can cause more maintenance action than 
needed. A simulation model of a prognostics and health management (PHM) system used 
as an Autonomic Logistics System (ALS) for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) was 
developed and used by (Miller et al., 2007). Their simulation utilized a large number of 
commonly used flight line measures of performance for aircraft availability and mission 
effectiveness. Multivariate statistical analysis of these measures provided ways to analyze 
the positive impact of a PHM on aircraft sortie generation. On the other hand their 
analysis showed a great sensitivity to false alarms. This sensitivity implies that more 
research effort should be devoted to investigating and trying to minimize false alarms 
without significantly degrading detection performance. 
An experiment was conducted on a fast military jet by (Read et al., 2008) to try to 
test SHM in a near real-world application. A BAE Hawk jet carrying an experimental test 
pod with specimens containing crack initiators was used to test flight the effect of 
maneuvers on the SHM system detection capability and the possibility of detecting crack 
growth during flight. The conclusion was that this system was effective in detecting a 
crack and the growth of the crack during flight. They noted a very large number of 
spurious noise events/signals, but were able to avoid an associated large amount of false 
positive indications through the use of guard sensors surrounding the area of interest.  
Test points were obtained that spanned the entire flight envelope, to include 6g turns, 
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acoustic noise levels in excess of 135 decibels, and considerable electromagnetic 
interference. While providing significant flight test results, a shortcoming is the fact that 
the test specimen was not part of the actual aircraft structure.   
      Given the large amount of data produced from IHM, improved statistical tools 
to clearly identify defects are necessary. A synopsis review conducted by (Sohn and Los 
Alamos National Laboratory, 2004) identified a shortage of well developed tools and 
algorithms for statistical pattern recognition in IHM. Many damage detection methods try 
to identify damage by solving an inverse problem (predicting a condition based on a 
measured response), which requires the construction of analytical models. These models 
have uncertainty and need to be validated by experimental results, making this approach 
less attractive for some applications. Neural network approaches can be used to map the 
inverse relationship between the parameter of interest and the measured response. The 
main drawback for this approach is that a large amount of data is needed for the damaged 
and undamaged component and this is not always available. Statistical process control 
and hypothesis testing methods can be employed without the same level of effort 
developing analytical models, but these approaches tend to be limited to damage onset 
detection without knowledge of the failure condition triggering the onset.   
 
Durability and Robustness 
Many studies show degradation of IHM sensors over time due to static loads, 
cyclic loads, temperature and corrosion. Durability and robustness of a candidate IHM 
system must be characterized prior to any implementation decision.  An investigation into 
the effect of cyclic loads on sensor performance was conducted by (Kuhn, 2009). In this 
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research sensor degradation associated with cyclic strain was identified.  Experimental 
data was used to construct an analytic model of the sensor degradation. A probability of 
detection (POD) degradation model was also developed to show the effect of the 
degradation on the overall performance of an SHM system. In their experiment (Beard et 
al., 2005) found that environmental conditions such as temperature can affect the signal 
obtained from sensors. This research used calibration to compensate for temperature 
variation based on the structure and application. More research is needed to characterize 
fully the degradation due to environmental factors such as vibration, temperature and 
corrosion. 
 
Implementation Issues 
Design of an IHM system should be part of a system engineering framework that 
integrates health monitoring and maintenance with all other requirements for the aircraft. 
For a new aircraft design, this would begin with the conceptual design of the system and 
would affect decisions regarding operating conditions, levels of maintenance and 
inspection intervals, among others. Less extensive implementations are being proposed 
for aging aircraft. A framework for SHM system design was presented by (Malkin et al., 
2007) which could be applied to aging aircraft through hot spot monitoring. The initial 
step in their framework, understanding the structure, involves characterization of the 
materials, loads, stresses and strains, environment and interfaces.  The data needed to 
support an implementation decision for an SHM system can be obtained by focusing on 
the following points: benefits and drawbacks of the SHM system, requirements for the 
SHM system, available SHM technologies, detail design of the SHM systems, identifying 
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the SHM design that meet the requirements and the cost of the SHM system that meet the 
requirements. Although this framework was developed for hot spot monitoring it could 
be modified for other applications as mentioned by the study. 
      A research by (Millar, 2007) identifies barriers that have slowed acceptance 
and use of prognostics health management tools in military propulsion systems over the 
past two decades.  In particular, they note incomplete total life cycle systems engineering 
management (TLCSM) as a barrier to implementation. The US Department of Defence 
Acuisition Guidebook states in Section 4.1.3 TLCSM in Systems Engineering: “It is 
fundamental to systems engineering to take a total life cycle, total systems approach to 
system planning, development, and implementation.” It is also important to implement 
TLCSM not only on new systems but also on legacy systems currently operating to 
control the high maintenance cost as the systems continue to operate beyond their design 
life. This research describes up and down periods of development associated with engine 
condition monitoring. The up periods are triggered by the cost benefits that could be 
gained by successful monitoring, and the down periods occur when technology is not 
available for the monitoring system. This study concludes that the use of TLCSM through 
the systems engineering process is the right tool to close the gaps that are holding up 
large scale applications and implementation of IHM.  
      Advanced Integrated Vehicle Health Monitoring systems (IVHM) are 
expected to formulate a response based on the extent of the damage.  This is contrasted 
with pure monitoring systems that only report damage (Price et al., 2003). This study 
sub-divided the problem as follows: 
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• Detection of damage. Requires knowledge of the environment and 
anticipated damage modes;   
• Development of sensors will depend on the time required for the system 
to respond; 
• Characterization of damage. This may be accomplished during detection 
of damage or may require additional and/or different sensors; 
• Prioritization of the seriousness of damage.  Damage that can 
compromise the mission of the vehicle will obviously be given greater 
urgency; 
• Identification of the cause of the damage.  This may require an intelligent 
system populated by large numbers of sensors providing information on the 
vehicle as a whole;  
• Formulation of a response.  This could be an individual or sequence of 
actions, to include panic responses where appropriate;  
• Execution of a response. This could involve reconfiguration of the 
vehicle or restriction of operating conditions. 
 The integration process associated with both aging and new aircraft is considered 
a major weakness in the implementation of IHM.  In the near future an IHM system could 
be integrated on aging aircraft to monitor known failure modes. Aging aircraft face a 
challenge on how to integrate an IHM system with conditional based maintenance (CBM) 
because design choices will be limited by the existing system architecture. A number of 
integration issues were researched by (Buderath, 2004) and concluded the following. 
There should be a clear process for integration to ensure the right selection of an IHM 
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system, data analysis, and sensor location. Integration should be addressed to reach 
acceptance on all system levels. An integrated process is needed during the development 
phase of an IHM system to be able to fully integrate with CBM to meet safety concerns 
and reduce the costs associated with maintenance and repair actions.  
 
Business Case 
The presentation of a solid business case for the IHM system is a great challenge 
and arguably is the main factor contributing to the slow implementation of this 
technology. Factors that could help create a business case are the understanding of the 
customer needs and requirements and performing a credible cost and risk analysis (Perez 
et al., 2010). 
Quantifying cost reduction in the total life cycle of a system through use of IHM 
needs to be presented. Few research attempts to quantify the cost benefit of IHM are 
found in literature, and wide discrepancies can be noted in the cost savings estimates. In 
one study it is estimated that implementation of SHM on a commercial transport aircraft 
could result in a 30% to 40% reduction in maintenance requirements. This would result in 
a recovery of the initial implementation costs in only two to three years (Kent et al., 
2000).  Another research study (Schmidt et al., 2004) showed only a one percent 
reduction of the maintenance costs by using SHM systems on an AIRBUS aircraft; 
however, the authors noted the omission of consideration for increased availability due to 
reduced inspection times. Another finding of this study was a reduced fuselage panel 
weight by up to 15 percent using SHM. This impacts cost in many ways such as lower 
fuel consumption and longer operation range. Research on aging military aircraft showed 
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cost benefits of using an SHM on some hot spots of the structure of a tornado fighter, but 
suggests the implementation should be limited to hot spots where real payoff can be 
identified (Boller, 2001).  
A unique cost-benefit analysis for the allocation and cost justification of an 
Integrated System Health Management (ISHM) at the conceptual design level was 
presented by (Hoyle et al., Mehr, 2007). An optimization framework was used to 
determine the optimal allocation of ISHM to maximize profit. This was calculated using a 
profit function formulated using single attribute objectives as the product of system 
availability and revenue per unit availability minus the summation of costs associated 
with detection and risk. This framework also addressed the optimal detection/false alarm 
threshold and inspection interval, assuming the availability of parameters characterizing 
the sensor in terms of detection, false alarm rate and failure rate. When this framework 
was applied to an aerospace system it was shown that applying ISHM increased profit by 
11%, reduced cost by a factor of 2.4 and increased the inspection intervals by a factor of 
1.5. A useful extension of this work would involve modification and application for 
systems not driven by revenue generation, such as military aircraft, which can still benefit 
by reduction in the total life cycle cost (LCC).  
The number of sensors needs to be optimized to provide desired effectiveness 
within cost and weight constraints. A balance between detection sensitivity, false alarms 
and the number of sensors needs to be achieved. Many models are developed in the 
general area of structural monitoring. For example a Reliability-Based System 
Assessment was used by (Hosser et al., 2004) for monitoring buildings structures with 
sensors. This computer code consists of a data base module, a computational module and 
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a statistical module for the optimization of the assessment cycle. Another promising area 
for optimization is the use of genetic algorithms, which can be used for discrete value 
and/or non-convex solution spaces to determine the optimal number and location of 
sensors for damage locations (Boller, 2000).  
Another approach to quantify cost benefit was used by (Kapoor et al., 2008) using 
optimization and simulation of a maintenance phase with SHM technology applied to 
commercial aircraft. The effect of using SHM technologies to reduce maintenance 
downtime was presented. The concept of this approach was to identify the critical paths 
along the maintenance process. After a critical maintenance path was identified it was 
modified with an SHM alternative approach. After optimization and simulation a 
reduction factor of 6 for a critical path task was achieved, resulting in an increase of 100 
hrs of aircraft availability over the life cycle. This study indicates that cost benefit 
analysis for SHM should involve consideration of defined maintenance phases 
scheduling.  
Standardization of IHM systems across different platforms should help in 
reducing the ownership cost as well. In the automobile industry IHM has seen wider 
application than in the aircraft industry, as evidenced by systems like General Motor’s 
On-Star (You et al., 2005). These authors investigated remote diagnostics and 
maintenance systems and identified the cost reduction associated with standardization 
across different automobile models. 
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Conclusion 
IHM systems face many obstacles and gaps that have resulted in the slow 
implementation in real-world applications. These obstacles include technology 
performance, implementation issues and a solid business case that justifies the investment 
in an IHM system.  
A major technology performance issue is the reliability of an IHM system. False 
alarms that could be produced from this system can cause more maintenance than needed. 
More research should be devoted to investigating and trying to minimize false alarms 
without significantly degrading detection performance. The large amount of data 
produced from monitoring needs improved statistical tools to clearly identify defects. 
Current tools such as Numerical Modeling, Neural Networks and Analysis Hypotheses 
are available but have their disadvantages. Durability and robustness are additional 
technology performance issues for an IHM system. Many studies show degradation of 
IHM sensors over time due to static loads, cyclic loads, temperature and corrosion. 
Design of an IHM system should utilize a Systems Engineering framework that 
integrates health monitoring and maintenance with all other requirements for the system. 
For a new aircraft design, this would begin with the conceptual design of the system and 
would affect decisions regarding levels of maintenance and inspection intervals, among 
others. Less extensive implementations are likely appropriate for aging aircraft.  In the 
near future an IHM system could be implemented on aging aircraft to monitor known 
failure modes. Aging aircraft face a challenge on how to implement an IHM system for 
conditional based maintenance (CBM) because design choices will be limited by the 
existing system architecture. More research must be done before full integration of an 
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IHM system into CBM can be achieved. Longer term, the use of an IHM system on new 
aircraft could result in monitoring the full system in real time.  
The presentation of a solid business case for the IHM system is a great challenge 
and arguably is the main factor contributing to the slow implementation of this 
technology. Approaches and models to quantify the reduction in life cycle cost by using 
these systems is an important field of study. The number of sensors needs to be optimized 
to provide desired effectiveness within cost and weight constraints. Further, the health 
monitoring throughout the aircraft must be extensive enough to result in a lengthening of 
scheduled inspection intervals if it is to provide maintenance cost savings.  
Standardization of IHM systems across different platforms should help in reducing the 
ownership cost as well. The literature indicates that adoption of IHM in the commercial 
world is further along than in the military due to more aggressive cost saving measures. 
Application of IHM to new military jets has started to appear, but implementation in 
aging aircraft is lagging far behind. A solid business case for the aging military aircraft 
remains as an open area of investigation.        
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